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THE HONORABLE PROFESSION OF REGULATION
W.LAm, A. LovETT*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Regulating the marketplace in consensus democracies like the United
States of America is best described as a pragmatic art. I Regulatory agencies,

boards, and executive departments accumulate through historic evolution.
The legislative mandates of these bodies normally are compromises that are

loosely defined at the outset, with occasional adjustments to suit recent
developments and current problems. This evolutionary process never can
reflect a single, clear-cut ideology because considerable latitude for discretion

exists for appointees within each Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Mayoral
administration in a large federal democracy with fifty states, hundreds of

sizeable cities, and thousands of smaller towns and rural counties. Although
simplifying slogans like the American System, Populism, Progressivism,
New Freedom, Business Government, New Deal, Fair Deal, Eisenhower
Republicanism, New Frontier, Great Society, New Federalism, Consumer
Protection, Environmentalism, Least Restrictive Regulation, and Deregula-

tion were fashionable in succeeding presidential administrations, there has
* Professor of Law and Economics, and Director, International Law, Trade and
Finance Program, Tulane Law School, New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. The following works provide a broad survey and diverse perspectives on the evolution
of regulation: AMERIcAN ENT PRIuSE INsTITUTE, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSES: REGULATORY REFORM;
A SURVEY OF PROPOSALS IN =an 94ra CONGRESS (1976); D. Bores & P. Vxum, PUBLIC
CONTROL OF BusiNEss (1977); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); COMMISSION ON
LAw AND TE ECONOMY, AME ICAN BAR ASs'N., FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM
(1978); G. EADs & M. Fix, THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEY: AN ASSESSMENT (1984); G.
EADs & M. Fix, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN's REGULATORY DILEMMA (1984); J. R. T. HuGHEs,
TEE GOVERN MENT HA.Br: ECONOMIC CONTROL FROM COLONIAL Ibm TO THE PRESENT (1977);

R. LrrAN & W. NoanE~us, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION (1983); T. McCRAw, PROPHETS
OF REGULATION (1984); T. McCRAw, REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS (1981);

A. S. MILLER, Tam MODERN COR'ORATE STATE: PRIVATE Gov
rNTs AND THE AMERICAN
CONs1rImON (1976); T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON & P. VEiurm, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
Busn;Fs (1985); F. PooLE, JR., INSTEAD OF REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1982); PRsEIDENT'S FOR A NAT'L AGENDA FOR THE 1980s, GOVERNMENT AND
THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS (1980); PROMOTING COMPETITION
IN REGULATED MARKETS (A. PHILIPS, ED. 1975); ECONOMIC REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT 198189; D. RrTcHm, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980); L. SCHwARTZ, J. FLYNN
& H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS: GOVERNMENT REGULATION (6th
ed. 1985); L. WEms & M. KLASS, REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED (1986);

Public Control of Enterprise: Neoclassical Assault and Neo-InstitutionalReform, 18 J. ECON.
ISSUES 353 (1984); Trebing, Regulation of Industry: An InstitutionalistApproach, 21 J. ECON.
ISSUES 1707 (1987); The Burden of Government Regulation, Ch 5 (1983); Reforming Government Regulation of Economic Activity, Ch 6 (1982), and Reforming Regulation: Strengthening
Market Incentives, Ch 5 (1986).
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been pragmatic latitude for many regulatory policies. And each slogan
allows ample leeway for disagreement with respect to details.
The political, legal, and administrative problem we now face is determining how to make the best of this on-going "tradition". How can we
wisely manage regulation in the public interest? Approaching this problem
involves unavoidable controversies: 2 (i) deciding the extent to which the
marketplace suffers failure or shortcomings and whether regulatory remedies
can improve things; (ii) selecting the best, or at least a workable, mix of
regulatory remedies when the corrective process itself may involve costs and
distortions; (iii) limiting the distortions of "regulatory capture" by special
interest groups that warp corrective remedies in their own favor; and (iv)
limiting the distortions of "market capture" by trade associations, concentrated oligopolies, or dominant firms. At the heart of practical controversies
within each channel of potential regulation are conflicting claims and
estimates about these costs, benefits, and distortions. Special interest lobbies,
trade groups, regulatory agencies, rival politicians and parties, usually
disagree. These debates are often pejorative and sometimes confusing to the
uninitiated and general public.
Cynical observers are tempted to throw up their hands in despair. Even
worse, some observers simply join in the struggle for spoils and relative
power and accept a jungle of selfish misrepresentation. Nonetheless, a good
many countries, despite partial controversy, have achieved impressive records
of industrial growth and technical progress. These success stories3 show that
sustained, rapid economic growth, industrial progress, and supportive regulation to foster success are attainable objectives. More countries, including
the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand
recently, still maintain reasonably comfortable living standards and respectable environmental quality, although their industrial and economic growth
has slowed lately. In many ways, these nations can be regarded as reasonably
though the nations differ
solid success stories for the regulatory art, even
4
somewhat on the details of regulatory policy.
2. See, e.g., J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNENT FINANCE: EcONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (5th ed. 1973); R. MUSORAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959); see
also H. HINRICHs & G. TAYLOR, PRoGRAm BUDGETING AND BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS (1969); J.
LuFONT, FUN DmAETAI-s OF PUBLIC ECoNomcCs (1988); L. MEmwTz & S. SosNicK, THE
BUDGET'S NEW CLOTHES: A CRITIQUE OF PLANNINc-PRooRAmwIG-BUDGm-INO AND BENEFITCOST ANALYSIS (1971); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND PoLIcms (E. Bailey ed. 1987); G. STARLING, MANAGING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (1977); C. WOLF, MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES (1988); Wolf, A Theory of Non-Market Failure, 22 J. L. & EcoN. 107 (1979).

3. For example, the United States during the 1940s-1960s, Japan during the 1950s1980s, West Germany during the late 1940s-1980s, Switzerland during the 1940s-1980s, Taiwan
during the 1950s-1980s, and South Korea during the 1960s-1980s.
4. See L. REYNOLDS, ECONo0IC GROWTH IN Tm THa WORLD, 1950-1980 (1985)
(spreading success of economic development, industrial progress, and encouraging regulations
among "best performers"); W. Lov'Tr, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY (1987) 42-61 & nn. 37-72,
Table P-2, Appendices A-1 to A-7 (1987) (same); see also, OECD ECONOMIc OUTLOOK, Nos.
29-44 (July 1981-Dec. 1988) (giving economic reports on progress of industrial nations).
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Every modern industrial society employs at least twelve major channels

of regulation. 5 Widespread regulatory activity occurs in in each of these
channels. For sophisticated observers the issue is not really whether to
regulate because considerable regulation is unavoidable. The real issue is
how to regulate for maximum benefit and least cost in terms of the overall
long term interests of each society. At each stage in history, the successful
countries simply have achieved a more productive blend of regulation and
the marketplace. 6 These countries' overall economic performance reflects a
higher level of play in most channels or sectors of regulation. Obviously,
this success should not encourage a maximum amount of regulation or
intrusive smothering, because overregulation is a common source of underachievement and sluggishness. On the other hand, inadequate or improper
regulation often has led to serious breakdowns in or failures of perform7
ance.

The challenge is to achieve and sustain regulatory policies in all twelve

channels that assure high levels of national achievement and to maintain
industrial progress in an efficient and humane manner. A constant search
for improvement and a greater net benefit to society is the political and
economic test for these regulatory policies.8 Total agreement or absolute
Major Channels of Regulation-Modern Industrial Societies:
Macro-Economics, Finance, Banking, Securities, and Insurance.
Basic Utilities and Monopolies.
Transportation - Highways, Railways, Airlines, and Shipping
Communications - Telephones, Cables, Broadcasting, and Postal-Delivery
Services
5) Environmental - Land Use, Zoning, Pollution and Waste Control.
6) Depletable Resources - Mining, Fuels, Forests, Fisheries, Water Use.
7) Agricultural Regulation.
8) Industrial Development and Technology.
9) Labor Markets and Professions.
10) Health, Safety, and Welfare.
11) Tax Policies.
12) Competition and Liability Rules.
6. See supra note 4. The test for regulatory policy, and overall economic policy, is the
best blend of growth, progress, efficiency, opportunity, fairness, healthy distribution, attractive
environment, and aesthetics. See infra note 11.
7. See infra, notes 24-106.
8. See supra note I (citing works that deal with regulatory policies); S. BUCK, Tan
GRANGER MovmNT: A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,
AND SOCIAL MANIFESTATIONS, 1870-1880 (1913); R. BuCKHORN, NADER: THE PEoPLE's LAWYER
(1972); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALIsM & FREEDOM (1962); J. K. GALBRAnH, ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIC PURPosE (1973) J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNTED
STATES (5th ed. 1983); J. IcKs, THE AmEIUCAN NATION (1946); J. HICKS, Tan FEDERAL UNION
(2d ed. 1952); S. KRisLov & L. Musou, TaE PoLITics OF REGULATION (1964); C. LINDBLOM,
PoLmcs AND MARKETs: Tan WORLD'S POLIMCAL-ECONOiBc SYsTEs (1977); P. MAcAvoy,
TaE REGULATED INDUSTRES AND THE ECONOMY (1979); M. REAGAN, REGULATION: THE PoLmCs
OF POLICY (1987); R. STEEL, WALTER LiPsmAN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1980); F. THAYER,
5.
1)
2)
3)
4)

REBUILDNG AMERICA, THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC REGULATION (1984); M. WEIDENRAUM, Tan
FUTURE OF Busnmss REGULATION (1979); C. WOLF, supra note 2; Deregulation: A Fast Start

for the Reagan Strategy, Bus. WK Mar. 9, 1981; Graham, Regulative Political Theory:
Language, Norms and Ideology, 33 POL. STAD. 19 (1985).
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consensus among all parties is an unrealistic expectation because conflicting

interests always make these issues somewhat controversial. But cross-country
comparisons over the long run are among the best ways to maintain
reasonable objectivity about relative performance in each channel. This
game obviously requires expertise and invites considerable on-going discussion within and among different nations. Internationally and within each
society the experienced lawyers, economists, engineers, scientists, politicians
and administrators, both in government and industry, who manage these
regulatory efforts constitute the profession of regulation. To the extent their

work is responsible and beneficial to society, we can truly respect this
"Honorable Profession."
II.

ECONOMIC STANDARDS FOR REGULATORY POUCY

Abraham Lincoln expressed the best of nineteenth century wisdom when
he said: "Governments should do for the people what they cannot do for
themselves, or do so well for themselves." 9 Modern economic theory merely

adds that: (i) Government activity should yield net social benefit; and (ii)
the marginal social benefit from government activities should be positive

and equalized in all channels. In other words, net gains to society from
government activity are necessary, and yields from alternative program areas
should be equalized so that greater gains from some activities are not

neglected at the margin of public affordability. 10 This approach implies, of

course, that all tax burdens upon the public are offset by positive benefits

to society.
While these guidelines make perfect sense in the abstract, the problem

is determining how to implement the guidelines in practice. Politics brings
special pleaders. Current advocates for government spending, regulatory, or
accountability programs are resisted by those parties threatened by these
programs, such as targeted tax payers, the "regulated", others uncomfort-

able with public disclosure, and their lobbyists." The political game, with

9. A. LINCOLN, Fragment on Government in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 220, 221 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
10. In terms of the test for social net benefit that guides economic and regulatory policy,
it is important to utilize the best of "theoretical welfare economics." See K. ARRow, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIvmuAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); D. COLLARD, PRICES, MARKETS AND WELFARE
(1972); J. Da V. GRAAFF, THEORETCAL WELFARE ECONOMICs (1967); I. LITE, A CRIrnQUE
OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1957); E. MisHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: TEN INTRODUCTORY
ESSAYS (2d ed. 1969); J. ROTHENBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE (1961); W.
SAMUELS, PARETO ON POLICY (1974); Samuels & Buchanan, On Some Fundamental Issues in
PoliticalEconomy, 9 J. ECON. IsSUES 15 (1975).
11. An examination of the following chart reveals many of the problems facing marketplace regulation.
Economic Analysis-Marketplace Regulation
Economic Tests: Net Social Benefit Required; MSBij Equalized (All Channels);
Government Action Meets Test of Net Social Performance.
Market Problems: Lack of Sufficient Competition, Externality Distortions, Inadequate Knowledge, or Irresponsibility Can Weaken Performance, or Cause Substantial
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its strange bedfellows and logrolling, often yields inferior compromises.
Alliances commonly gather, especially in legislative bodies, to form a
majority with doubtful elements, including projects for selfish promoters.
Ideally a strong, competent, and responsible leadership should minimize
extra baggage. But outcomes vary over time, and weak leaders often fail
12
to control the corruption of political processes.

Market Failure.
Government Sponsored CorrectivesPublic Enterprise or Ownership
General Regulation (Price-Output Supervision)
Limited Regulation (Selective)
Corrective Taxes
Antitrust Remedies
Against Price Fixing
Against Exclusionary or Predatory Practices
Against Tying
Limits on Large Mergers
Deconcentration or Divestiture
Selective Support
Subsidies to Firms, Interests
Industry R&D Support
Patent Protection, Intellectual Property Rights
Relief Against Foreign Subsidies, Dumping, or Unfair Trade Practices
Tax Exemption or Relief
Tariffs on Imports
Accountability, Disclosure, and Public Information
Goals: Efficiency; Progress; Economic Growth; Broad Opportunity; Fairness; Healthy
Distribution; Attractive Environment and Aesthetics.
PoliticalProblems:
Market Capture or Distortion by Cartel Groups, Oligopolies, Monopolies, or Trade
Associations
Can Weaken or Impair Market Performance (Often Becomes "Self-Regulation" or
Facade Regulation)
Regulatory Capture or Distortion by Selfish Interest Groups, or Corrupt Alliances
(Often Becomes Facade Regulation)
Can Frustrate Government Correctives-Weaken or Impair Overall Performance
Oversight-Accountability Process: Essential-For both Government, and the Marketplace
12. The problem of capture or distortion of regulatory agencies by special interests and
of markets by dominant firms, oligopolies, associations, or elite classes, has been analysed
extensively from many perspectives. See W. ADAMS & J. BROCK, TE BsoEss CoiPLsx (1986);
J. BUCHANAN, R. TOLLISON & G. TUILOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT SEEKING SocmTY
(1980); A. DowNs, INsmE BUEUCRACY, (1967); B. Frey, Modern Political Economy (1978);
S. KRsLov & L. MusoLF, supra note 8; LAW AND ECONOMICs: AN INsTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(W. Samuels & A. Schmid ed. 1981); R. LEONE, WHO PROFIrs? WINEns, LOSERS, AND
GovEmmr REGULATION (1986); R. NoL & B. OwEN, TE POLrTCAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1983); PVATE WANTS AND PUBLIC
NEEDS (E. Phelps ed., 1972); A. Screm , PROPERTY, POWER AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1978); R.
SoLo, ECONoMIc ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1967); G. TULLOCK, PRIVATE WANTS,
PUBLC MEANS (1970); D. WARWICK, A THEORY OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY: POLITICS, PERSONALrry, AND ORGANIZATION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT (1975); 0. WIuIsoN, MARKETS AND
HIERARCImES (1975); Buchanan, Public Choice, CHALLENGE, Mar./Apr. 1988, at 4; Christainsen,
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Another common syndrome is "facade" regulation. Initial outrage,
scandal, or an embarrassing mess provides enough public recognition of a
problem to force response by government leaders. The industry in question
and media discussion, help focus attention on the problems. The government

throws together a regulatory panel with a loose mandate to do somethingwith an implicit side condition that the solution not be too tough, expensive,
or painful. As public awareness fades into specialized expertise, the targets
of regulation frequently take over, emasculate serious supervision, and
establish a protective screen of self-regulation. In this way, regulation can
become a useful facade, behind which the "regulated" industry or various
other groups can support their own vital interests. 3
The best solution to the corrupt logrolling and regulatory facade failures

of politics is an energetic, responsible media-scholar supervision process, in
which well-informed, idealistic "tribunes of the people" constantly seek out
and challenge regulatory abuses.' 4 Ombudsmen agencies, legislators eager to

On James Buchanan, CHaLEoE, Mar./Apr. 1988, at 11; Lindsay, A Theory of Government
Enterprise, 86 J. PoLITcAL ECoNoMY 106 (1976); Priest, The Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE
L. & PoL'y REV. 1 (1988); Sah & Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies
and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 716 (1986); Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6
BELL J. EcoNomcs 67 (1975).
13. Powerful elites or organizations in the marketplace often are often distortive and
regulation frequently can be used as a cover for parochial agendas. See supra note 12; see
also A. BERLE, POWER (1969); J. BROOKS, Tim TAKEOVER GAME (1987); CORPORATIONS AND
SOCIETY (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds. 1986); J.K. GAIRATH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER
(1983); A. JAY, CORPORATION MAN (1971); M. MAcCoBY, THE GA msm"i (1976); A. MICHEL
& I. SHAKED, TAKEOVER MADNESS: CORPORATE AMERICA FIrHTS BACK (1986); D. MORGAN,
MERCHANTS OF GRAIN (1979); C. SPRUILL, CONGLOamRATES AND Tm EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM
(1982); J. P. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY You CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS (1979); Adams &
Brock, Corporate Power and Economic Sabotage, 20 J. ECON. IsSUES 919 (1986); Dugger,
Power: An Institutional Framework of Analysis, 14 J. EcoN. ISSUEs 897 (1980); Klein,
Confronting Power in Economics: A PragmaticEvaluation, 14 J. ECON. ISSUES 871 (1980);
Lovett, Teamwork, Markets, and Regulation: Distortions Arising From Legal Parochialism,
15 J. ECON. Issms 409 (1981); Peterson, Power and Economic Performance, 14 J. ECON.
ISSUES 827 (1980).
14. Accountability and performance remain the fundamental challenges for businesses,
regulatory agencies, legislatures, and courts. See BusBMIss DIscLOuSRE: GOVERNMENT'S NEED
To KNOW (1979); P. DICKSON, TmN TANKS (1971); W. GELLHoRN, OMBUDSMEN A
OTHERS:
CITzENs' PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIEs (1967); D. HAPGOOD, THE SCRaWING OF THE AVERAGE
MAN (1974); M. BRUCE JOHNSON, THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMRICA (1978); L. KOHImER,
THE REGULATORS, WATCHDOG AGENCIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1969); C. MCCARRY,
CITIZEN NADER (1972); M. MINTz & J. COHEN, POWER INC.: PUBLIC AND PIVATE RULERs
AND How TO MAKE THEm AccoUNTABLE (1976); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELGMAN, TAMING
THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); R. NOLL, REpoPumo REGULATION (1971); B. OWEN & R.
BRAU ETGAM, THE REGULATION GAim: STRATEGIC USE OF THEADmmSTRATIVE PROCESS (1978);
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY CossmioN, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1977); D. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER (1968); Arnold, PoliticalControl
of Administrative Officials, 3 J. L. ECON & ORGANIZATION 279 (1987); Beatson, Legislative
Controlof Administrative Rulemaking: Lessonsfrom the BritishExperience, 12 CORNELL INT'L
L. REv. 199 (1979); Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments
for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539 (1976); Breyer,
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gain favorable attention, a well-financed, responsible press, enlightened,

protective guardians within universities, news organizations, and foundation
think-tanks are invaluable to this process. Sadly, even in countries that
generally enjoy fairly responsible governance, pockets of neglect or corruption exit. In these areas of governmental or market failure, it is often the
tribunate accountability process that has broken down, or fallen into the
hands of corrupt interests.
The Honorable Profession of Regulation requires a strong, healthy and,
if at all possible, decentralized tribunate process to be successful. This
process requires an independent press, ample access to information about
government and the marketplace, extensive and competent scholarship, a
liberal legal profession, and an open political system that accepts reasonable
criticism of government and the marketplace. Except for smaller countries,
where access may be easier in local community life, substantial decentralization is usually helpful. In large, centralized bureaucratic societies, problems of accountability for both government and the marketplace tend to be
magnified, and an effective tribunate is often frustrated or incomplete."
To avoid putting too much faith in the automatic workings of the
marketplace without reasonable regulation and law enforcement, it is- wise
to remember the words of Adam Smith, the father of modern liberal

JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1986); Brown, The
Courts and Agency Deregulation:Limitationson the PresidentialControl of Regulatory Policy,
39 ADMNm. L. Rzv. 27 (1987); Byse, Comments on a StructuralReform Proposal: Presidential
Directives to Independent Agencies, 29 ADNm. L. Rnv. 157 (1977); Davis, Deregulation and
Administrative Law, 40 ADMNi.L. REv. 67 (1988); Eads, HarnessingRegulation: The Evolving
Role of White House Oversight, REGULATION, May-June 1981, at 19; Garland, Deregulation
and JudicialReview, 98 HARv. L. Rnv. 507 (1985); Gerwin, The Deference Dilemma: Judicial
Responses to the Great Legislative Power Giveaway, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 289 (1987);
Harter & Eads, Policy Instruments, Institutions, and Objectives: An Analytic Frameworkfor
Assessing "Alternatives" to Regulation, 37 ADm. L. REv. 221 (1985); Leighton, Consumer
Protection Agency Proposals: The Origin of the Species, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 269 (1973);
Lovett, Teamwork, Markets, and Regulation: DistortionsArising from Legal Parochialism, 15
J.EcoN. IssUES 409 (1981); McGarity, Regulatory Reform and the PositiveState: An Historical
Overview, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 399 (1986); Nader, Corporate Secrecy v. Right to Know,
MULTINATIONAL MoNITOR (1980); Pierce & Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1175 (1981).
15. Most Americans take federalism for granted without fully appreciating the advantages
of decentralizing economic power and fostering more responsive community life that federalism
offers. While the American resistance to rapid change is understandable, the opportunities for
pragmatic progress and experimentation generally should outweigh this conservatism. The
replication of federalism within most states with counties, cities, and even townships is a
blessing for responsive governance. In fact, most misgovernance and demoralization in American life is concentrated within very large urban areas that lack healthy neighborhood institutions
and suffer from widespread proverty. See D. ENGDAHL, CoNsrTUIONAL FEDERALISM (1987);
M. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM (1987); E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS
AS IF PEoPLE MATTERED (1973); H. C. SinoNs, AN EcONoMIc POLICY FOR A FREE SocIETY 78120 (1948); Lightman, Welfare Ideologies and Theories of Federalism, 21 SOCIAL POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATION 15 (1987); McKay, Theory and Practice in Public Policy: The Case of the
New Federalism, 33 POL. STUD. 181 (June 1985).
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political economy. "The interest of dealers...in any particular branch of
trade or manufactures is always in some respect different from, and even
opposite to that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the
competition, is always the interest of the dealers." 16 By narrowing competition, dealers are allowed "to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax
upon the rest of their fellow-citizens.' 1 7 These dealers are "an order of
men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who
have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public,and
who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed
it." ' 18 In a comment anticipating modem antitrust policy, Smith observed
that "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion,but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public,
or in some contrivance to raise prices." 9
Smith was concerned about "the neglect, on the part of corporate
directors, of 'other peoples money'; the inclination of lawyers who are paid
' 20
by the length of their brief 'to multiply words beyond all necessity. '
Smith clearly understood the problems of public interest advocacy, and the
"difficulties that beset the path of those who oppose the 'sophistry of
merchants and manufacturers who are always demanding a monopoly
2
against their countrymen"' '
The member of parliament who supports every proposal for
strengthening this monopoly is sure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and influence
in an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of great
importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if
he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most
acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public
services, can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger,
arising from the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.22
In these remarks, Smith provides prophetic insight on the problems of
political distortion for the Honorable Profession of Regulation, and the
contemporary challenge to sound economic analysis.23

16. AD Am SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 250 (1776). For an impressive tribute to Adam
Smith, see J.GALBRArH, The Founding Faith:Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" inANNALs
OF AN ABIDING LmERAL (1979).

17. SmrrH, supra note 16, at 250.

18. Id.
19. Id.at 128.
20. H. SPIEGEL, THE GROwTH oP

ECONOmC THOUGHT

235 (1971).

21. Id.at 235-236.
22. SmrrH, supra note 16, at 435.
23. See supra note 11 (chart on economic analysis of market place regulation).
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Macro-Economics, Finance, Banking and Securities

Despite sharp controversies among economists since the Great Depression, post-war recoveries, stagflation strains in the 1970's, and recent debates
among Monetarists, Neo-Keynesians, Supply-Siders, and Traditional Bankers, greater consensus among OECD nations seems to be crystalizing for
the late 1980s and beyond. 24 Mild government budget deficits provide a
useful stimulus, if not carried to inflationary excess. Money and credit
supplies should expand gradually and fairly steadily to support economic
growth in accord with the needs of industry and trade. Tax levies must be
adequate to maintain essential government and social insurance responsibilities, but should not become burdensome or a disincentive to healthy savings
and investment. Countries violating these guidelines, usually with excessive
government deficits or excessive surges of monetary expansion, normally
experience significant inflation, a gradual depreciation of currency, and may
suffer serious capital flight or net disinvestment in aggravated circumstances.
Stagflation and economic sluggishness often follow.
Because international trade and capital flows broadened so greatly in
the last generation, 25 economies of the countries involved are becoming
more interdependent. This interdependence brings macroeconomic coordination. 26 We see this effect in recent Summit meetings,27 the European
Monetary System, and the Bank for International Settlements. The world
economy faces two important economic problems. The first problem is the
debt overloads of Latin American, African, and other developing countries.
These debt overloads cause capital flight, inflation, and development slumps.
The second problem is the large United States trade and payments deficits.
These recent deficits are traceable to large United States budget deficits,
higher interest rates, heavy foreign borrowing between 1983-88, and unequal
market openness and export subsidies by many important trading nations.
Although debt problems have stalled economic growth in the most
deficit prone developing countries, many less developed countries and newly
industrialized countries [hereinafter LDCs and NICs, respectively] are doing

24. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEmENTs, 58 ANN. REP. (1988) [hereinafter BIS 88];
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 57 Am. REP. (1987) [hereinafter BIS 87]; R. COOPER, ECONOIC
POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (1986); J. FRENKEL & A. RAGIN, FISCAL POLICYAND
ma WORLD EcONOMY (1987); GROUP OF TmRTY, INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMIC POLICY
COORDINATION (1988) INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS, RESOLVING Tm GLOBAL ECONOMIC CISis
AFTER WALL Sma-r (1987); INT'L MONETARY FUND, 1988 ANN. REp. (1988); INT'L MONETARY
FUND, 1987 ANN. REP. (1987); INT'L MONETARY FUND, 1986 ANN. REP. (1986); INT'L MONETARY
FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (1987) [hereinafter IMF]; T. MAYER, J. DUESENBERRY &
R. ALMER, MONEY, BANKINo AND ma EcONOMY (1987); OECD, 43 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (1988);
OECD 42 ECONOMIC OUrooK (1987); H. STEN, PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMICS: TBE MAKING OF
ECONOMIC POLICY FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN ANBEYOND 307-76 (1984).

25. The countries involved in the broadening of trade and capital flows are those countries
in the European Community and EFTA, together with the United States, Canada, Brazil,

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and others.
26. See supra note 24.
27. For example, the G-5, G-7, and G-12.
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better, and many manufacturing activities from industrial nations are shifting

to lower wage locations. 28 Japan, West Germany, South Korea, Taiwan,
and other countries still enjoy strong growth and prosperity. The United
States achieved a considerable recovery after the 1981-83 recession, but most
experts agree that the country's budget deficits had become excessive and
that Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction efforts were too slow. 29 Political

conflicts between Republican and Democratic leaders, along with logrolling
alliances, made fiscal discipline difficult. 0 Gradual progress might come in
the next administration, however, and improved fiscal discipline would align
U.S. macroeconomic policies with recent OECD-IMF guidelines.
Debt overload countries, meanwhile, needed greater servicing relief and
cut back on net capital flows to creditor nations. 3' This reduction forced
multinational banks to write off more LDC debts, although new lending or
capital investment was not easy to obtain for the weakest borrowers. A
broadening consensus favored additional IMF, World Bank, and regional

development bank resources and more generous multinational bank rescheduling. But the lower debt developing countries like India and China,
along with NICs like South Korea and Taiwan, were growing rapidly. This

rapid growth demonstrated that more responsible development strategies
could be successful. This evolution further reinforced confidence in OECDIMF consensus guidelines.

Banking regulation became more harmonized across international
boundaries, with the Basle G-12 risk-based capital requirements of 1987-

DAmucAN FOREIGN
28. See B. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST? INTER ATIONAL BANC NoD
POLICY (1986); R. DORNBUSCH, DOLLARS, DEBTS AND DEnicrrs (1987); D. LESSARD & J.
WIuiIAmSoN, CAPITAL FUGoHT AND THIRD WORLD DEBT (1987); W. LOVETT, WORLD TR.ADE
RIVALRY 137-166 (1987); Kilborn, A Rising Challenge to the Reagan Policy on World Debt,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988 at ES, col. 1.
29. See R. BRYANT, G. HOLTHAm & P. HOOPER, EXTERNAL DEFICITS AND THE DOLLAR:
THE PIT AND THE PENDULUM (1988); J. FAUX, GETTING RID OF TH TRADE DEFICIT: A CHEAER
DOLLAR IS NOT ENOUGH (1988); W. LoVErr, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY 189-238 (1987); S. MARus,
DEFicITs AND TH DOLLAR: THE WORLD ECONOMY AT RisK (1985 & Supp. 1987); Bergsten,
Economic Imbalances and World Politics, 65 FOREIGN AssAins 770 (1987); Calleo, Cleveland
& Silk, The Dollar and the Defense of the West, 66 FOREIGN AFFAS 846 (1988); Reich, The
Economics of Illusion, 66 FopmIGN AFFAmS 316 (1988); Silk, The U.S. and the World Economy,
65 FoREiGN AFsAits 458 (1986).
30. Most media commentators and the financial press agreed that the next presidential
administration needed to show tougher budget discipline and to reduce deficits. Although
neither Bush nor Dukakis could afford to target spending cuts or significant new taxes in their
hard-fought 1988 political compaign, the consensus among economists in the United States
and abroad was that the U.S. needed stronger fiscal discipline than it used in 1984-88. See
supra notes 24, 29.
31. See Kilborn, A Rising Challenge to the Reagan Policy on World Debt, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 23, 1988, at Ef, col 1; see also supra note 28, Meanwhile, U.S. banks were forced to
write off major amounts of Latin American debt in the second quarter of 1987 because of
reduced payments by these debt overload countries. See Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision, and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 1366, 1394 Appendix Table I
(1989) (discussing LDC debt exposure of major U.S. banks); see also Kilborn, Debt-Policy
Shift Set on Third World, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1989, at 17, col.6.
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88.32 This harmonization strengthened capital adequacy for banking institutions and promoted a more level playing field. Although banking and
savings & loan failures increased in parts of the United States and in some
33
other countries, these failures reflected mainly overspeculative lending.
Tightened bank supervision, forced mergers, consolidation for weak institutions, and generous recapitalization credits were solving these problems.
Experts agreed that the industry needed stronger "moral hazard" discipline
to prevent excessive and imprudent lending. Stronger moral hazard discipline
meant: (i) renewed bank and thrift supervision; (ii) stronger capital and risk
based capital requirements; (iii) risk adjusted deposit insurance premia; and
(iv) broader diversification and securitization of asset portfolios.
Securities regulation has improved greatly in the United States since the
Great Depression.3 4 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces
extensive disclosure, and tries to limit unfair and deceptive practices. Private
stockholder litigation reinforces the SEC's efforts. The SEC's regulatory
efforts cannot prevent occasional surges of bull market optimism and
subsequent sags or corrections. Although gradual increases in international
ownership of securities could yield more volatility, broader diversification
of investor portfolios seems desirable and might be reasonably safe, provided
that the OECD-IMF consensus and stable, healthy growth are maintained
in the global marketplace. Commentators are concerned, however, about
possible overleveraging by many companies, undue takeover activity that
neglects long-term productivity, strains on pension funds, and controversy
over the level of integration of banking and securities firms that might be
desirable. 3 Congressional attention has focused upon "firewalls" between
banking activities, securities underwriting and marketing, insurance activities, and other industries, as it tried to develop compromise legislation on
36
financial boundaries.

32. See Lovrr, supra note 31, at 1382-87 (giving complete description of recent Basle
9-12 risk based capital requirements that were implemented between 1987-88); see also R.
DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANIUG (1986).
33. Examples of overspeculative lending include lending based on an oil-patch boom,
farm land inflation, and real estate development.
34. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION (6th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1988);
D. RATER, SECURITIES REGULATION (3d ed. 1988); see also W. LOVETT, BANKING AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 296-337 (2d ed. 1988).
35. See, e.g., J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAm:E (1987); H. KAuF AN, INTEREST RATES,
THE MARKETS AND THE NEW FINANCIAL WORLD 34-89 (1986); A. MICHAEL & I. SIAKED,
TAKEOVER MADNESS: CORPORATE AMERICA FIGHTS BACK (1986); D. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M.
SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFs, AND ECONoMc EFFICMNCY, (1987); Deal Mania, BusINEss
WEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 74-96. For a discussion of extensive concerns about strains on pension

funds, see Lovett, supra note 31, at 1391 n.84. For a discussion of the controversy on bank

and other financial institution boundaries, see Reform of the Nations Banking and Financial
Systems: Hearings Before The Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation,
and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess, Parts 1-4 [hereinafter Hearings].
36. For extensive discussion of the firewalls controversy, see R. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD
BANKS Do? (1987); Hearings, supra note 35.
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Meanwhile, good long-term growth and profits for insurance companies
have encouraged more banking and securities firms to seek diversification
in the insurance sector. Until quite recently, life and health insurance and
liability and property insurance were independent industries, largely insulated
from banking and securities, and regulated only at the state level by
Commissioners or Departments of Insurance. Insurance regulation is comprehensive and includes chartering and licensing, capital requirements, reserves and solvency, rate making and supervision, standard contracts, and
consumer protection responsibilities. 7 Most insurance companies are specialized to the insurance industry. But a few leading conglomerates, including
Sears'-Allstate Dean Witter-Coldwell Banker and Prudential-Bache, have
shown greater diversification interest, and bank lobbies have been fighting
for broader insurance powers since the early 1980s. On the other hand,
independent insurance agents, direct writer sales forces, and most insurance
companies are fighting hard to limit these encroachments. Occasional,
modest inroads by bank holding companies, local banks, and local thrifts
have been made, and it remains to be seen whether the insurance sector
might be commingled in any substantial way with the banking or securities
distribution industries. If federally regulated banks and securities firms
merge extensively with insurance companies, however, substantial pressures
will develop to harmonize capital requirements, reserves, and solvency
supervision, including firewalls to insulate affiliates from undue risks.
Federal regulation of insurance may follow as an indirect consequence. 38
B. Basic Utilities and Monopolies
Monopolies exist when production costs allow only one firm in a market,
and entry is not feasible or economical. Examples of these monopolies are
electric power, natural gas, telephone, and water distribution networks. In
these markets fixed costs are large and no room exists in a given locality
for a duplicating network with expensive capital investment. Railroads,
canals, urban transit, and even airlines were more monopolistic than they
are today, even though they now are subject to more competition from

37. For standard texts on insurance regulation, see K.

BLACK & H. SKIPPER, LIFE
(l1th ed. 1987); M. DORyMAN, INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1987); S.S.
HUBNER, K. BLAcK, & R. KLINE, PROPERTY AND LiA~mTY INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1982); W.
LovE r, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTIUTIONs LAW IN A NUTSHELL 338-379 (1988); G. REJDA,
PaiciP Es OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1986); see also infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text
(discussing current tort and related liability insurance controversies).
38. If banking and financial conglomerates extensively integrate or merge with insurance
underwriting, increased federal supervision of insurance capital, reserves, profits, and insolvency
risks is likely in one form or another. See W. LovWTT, supra note 34, at 374-79; Hearings,
supra note 35, Part 3, at 45, 74-75, 80-82, and 226-31.
Insurance companies, agencies, and sales forces are greatly alarmed at the prospect that
banks and thrifts will tie sales of insurance policies to commercial, real estate, home, car, and
other consumer loans. This prospect, the insurers fear, would shift the larger part of insurance
policy sales away from the presently established insurance markets into the hands of banks
and thrift institutions. See Hearings, supra note 35, Part 3, at 1-40, 96-189.
INSURANCE
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other facilities. Alternative treatments for monopolies are public enterprise,
public utility regulation, or taxation to limit monopolistic profits. A supplementary approach is to provide maximum freedom for vigorous competition, including substantial antitrust enforcement, to ensure more freedom
of entry, at least in the nearby markets or fringes of the natural monopoly.
These treatments are designed to expand output, reduce prices, eliminate
maldistribution, and enhance efficiency. At the heart of these treatments,
regardless of whether public or private enterprise seems more desirable, lies
a need to supervise efficient investments, choice of technology, range and
quality of output and services, and the level and structure of pricing.
Because monopolies lack competitive discipline, they often suffer slackness,
overstaffing, excessive capitalization, and technological under-achievement.
For the United States, public utility regulation is the main solution for
monopoly industries. 9 Federal, state, and municipal authorities supervise
the rate of return and expenses of public utilities. The regulatory commissions review revenues from rates and tariffs by focusing on the permissible
rate base, rate of return and expenses, together with some supervision of
the rate or pricing structure. This effort can be summarized with two
formulas:

(1) Revenues [level] = e + (b - d)r, where e = expenses, b = rate
base, d = depreciation, and r = allowable rate of return; and
(2) Revenues [structure] = (rate structure) x (usage or traffic).
Regulation of the rate structure controls revenue levels. In this way, regulators can prevent the worst inefficiency and overcharging, provided that a
strong regulatory effort is made with sufficient access to the relevant
information. Expenses (e) include labor, salaries, fuel, repairs, taxes, and
other current operating costs. These costs must be covered in order to
maintain service at adequate levels. And one way or another, the cost of
capital also must be covered in order to maintain service. The cost of
capital is reflected in (b - d)r. The rate base (b), reduced by accumulated
depreciation (d), and multiplied by the allowable rate of return (r) equals
the cost of capital. The rate base (b) represents capital invested in the
enterprise, including plant, equipment, land and other assets. The regulatory
commissions generally valued these assets in terms of historical costs for

39. For extensive background on public utility regulation, see J. BONBRiGHT, PRINCIPLES
OF PoBc UTILITY RATrEs, (1961); M. CREw & P. KLEINDORFER, THE EcONomIcs OF PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION (1986); A. DANIELSON & D. K AmscHEN, CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC
UTILITY EcoNoMIcs (1983); P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEjOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONoMIcs (1964);
E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES (2d ed. 1987); K. Howe & E. RASMUSSEN,
PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (1982); A. KAHN, I THE EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION
(1970); A. KAHN, 2 THE EcoNomcs OF REGULATION (1970); T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON & P.
VERKmU,supra note 1, at 73-342; PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION, (H. Trebing ed. 1968);
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 3-41 (J. Wilson, ed. 1950); UTLrr REGULATION: NEW DIRECTIONS
IN THEORY AND POLICY (W. Shepard & T. Gies eds. 1966); C. WLcox & W. SHEPHERD,

PUBLIC POLICIES TowARD Bus, Ess 331-428 (5th ed. 1975); Trebing, The Chicago School Versus
Public Utility Regulation, 10 J. ECON. IsSUES 97 (1976).
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reasons of accounting convenience. 40 Rates should provide for: (i) adequate

service; (ii) financial integrity and solvency; (iii) proper compensation for
4
risk; and (iv) the need to attract further capital. 1
Unfortunately, firms tend to pad expenses and the rate base, not only
by conscious design, but simply as a result of inadequate incentives under
cost plus pricing With fixed rates of return. Because each regulatory agency
tends to establish a stable rate of return, normally ranging from seven to
fifteen per cent of the rate base, net of depreciation, public utilities often
lack incentive to minimize their costs. 42 Despite these weaknesses in traditional public utility regulation, the supervision and public consciousness of
regulated monopolies have reduced much of the worst monopolistic distortion, excess pricing, maldistribution and waste.
Unhappily, public utility or regulatory commissions too often lack the
technical talent, expert consultants, information and administrative skill to
do much more than passively review the accounting data prepared by
utilities. 43 Thus, the success of public utilities depends frequently upon the

40. A majority of states in the U.S. use a more complex "fair value" standard for
evaluating the rate base (b), which includes replacement cost as well as historical or original
cost. But the needs for replacement capital normally are taken into account in determining
the allowable rate of return (r), so that original cost is usually sufficient, as well as the most
convenient method of rate base calculation. For more detailed discussions of rate making, see
J. Bo NRiGHT, supra note 39, at 26-406, E. GEntHoRN & R. PIERCE, supra note 39, at 101229; K. HowE & E. RAsMUSSEN, supra note 39, at 64-145; A. KAHN, 1 EcoNoMcs OF
REGULATION, supra note 39, at 25-199; T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON & P. VRKCUM, supra note
39, at 218-432; L. SclwARTz, J. FLYN & H. FIRST, supra note 1, at 659-829; C. Wracox &
W. SHEPHERD, supra note 39, at 359-390; see also Miller, Rate Structure Reform: A Review

of the CurrentDebate 12 J. EcoN. IssuEs, 625-626.
41. See, e.g, FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); see generally A.
KArN, 1 EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION (1970); A. KAHN, 2 EcoNomcs OF REGULATION (1970).
Further controversy revolves around the relative importance of risk, the effect of inflation,
the distribution of equity and debt in the capital structure, and, thus, the appropriate level of
(r). Current rates of return generally range between seven and fifteen percent, depending on
the regulatory jurisdiction. On more recent controversies, see D. ANDERsON, REGULATORY
PoLrrcs AND ELEacC UTUrrras (1981); M. CREw & P. KLEINDORFER, supra note 39; A.
DANELSON & D. KAmERsCBEN supra note 39; E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 39; W.
GomLEY, THE PonIcs OF Ptuc UTIrry REGULATION (1983); K. Hown & E. RASmuSSEN,
supra note 39; T. MORGAN, J. HARisoN & P. VEaKum, supra note 1; Miller, Rate Structure
Reform: A Review of the Current Debate, 12 J. EcoN. Issuas 609 (1978); Trebing, Public
Utility Regulation:A Case Study in the Debate Over Effectiveness Of Economic Regulation,
18 J. ECON. Issuas 223 (1984); Trebing, Regulation of Industry: An InstitutionalistApproach,
21 J. ECON. IssuEs 1707 (1987).
42. A few regulatory bodies have experimented with performance standards for rate level
determination, which try to build in more economic incentives for efficiency. See, e.g, Averch
& Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. EcoN. REv. (1962);
Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public
Utility Price Regulations, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 291 (1974); see also generally E. GELLHoRN & R.
PIERCE, supra note 39; K. HowE & E. RAsMUSSEN, supra note 39; A. KAHN, 1 EcoNomcs OF
REGULATION, supra note 39; TRnNio, supra note 1. The problem is to select to the extent
feasible the best blend of incentives, oversight, accountability and competition.
43. Strictly speaking, the expense of reasonable public accountability and oversight should
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utilities' own engineering and executive talent. Common shortcomings are
excessive investment, duplicating facilities, and generous operating expenses.
On the other hand, an ample latitude for equipment and personnel often
enables the utilities' quality of service to be relatively high, at least in
comparison with poorly funded public enterprise monopolies in other countries.
Recent developments in U.S. utility regulation reflect the continuing
challenge for adequate review of investments, costs, and rates. 44 In power
regulation, many plants, often nuclear, were built with excessive cost overruns, delays, or controversy about location and design. Prudence review,
though needed, frequently came too late, and costly blunders of excess
capacity, giantism or environmental impact accumulated. Excess cost estimates due to badly designed or unnecessary plants have run as high as one
hundred to two hundred billion dollars for the power industry alone in the
last twelve years.
A trend toward somewhat smaller generating plants allows more competition from cogenerators, and perhaps more regional and municipal rivalry
for investments and pricing. But the scope for somewhat greater competition
forces more regulatory and antitrust concern upon issues of system access,
interconnection, joint usage of wires and transfer, and "wheeling" of power.

be worked into the cost of operating public utilities and other regulated firms. In this way,
regulatory oversight expenses can be paid as a user tax and included within the prices charged
for electricity, gas distribution, local telephone service, or regulated transportation fares. But
care must be taken to minimize capture of the accountability process by parochial interests.
In other words, Quis custodes custodiet, or who guards the guardians?
44. Acton & Mitchess, Do Time-of-Use Rates Change Local Curves? And How Would
You Know?, 106 PUB. UTr. FORT. 15 (1980); Allison, Imprudent Power ConstructionProjects:
The Malaise of TraditionalPublic Utility Policies, 13 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 507 (1985); Allison,
Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission, 15 TULSA L.J. 262 (1979); Barber, A Workable Test of a Workably
Competitive Bulk Power Market, 121 PUB. UTm. FORT. 13 (1988); Berry, Least-cost Planning
and Utility Regulations, 121 Pun. Urm. FORT. 9 (1988); Cavanagh, Responsible Power
Marketing in an Increasingly Competitive Era, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 331 (1988); Gentieu, The
Equity Discounting Method in the Determination of Losses from "Direct" Utility Plant Cost
Disallowances, 121 PunL. Unm. FORT. 22 (1988); Gerber, Questions for Regulators in a
Competitive Electric Utility Environment, 122 PUB. UrT. FORT. (1988); Howard & Westfall,
The FERC Opens Pandora'sBox: Increased Competition and Heightened Antitrust Exposure
for Electirc Utilities, 121 Pun. UT. FORT. 22 (1988); Joskow & Schmalensee, Incentive
Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON RPa. 1 (1986); Lennon & Meyers, Net Energy
Use Impacts of PURPA Implementation, 121 Pun. UT. FORT. 28 (1988); Norton, Regulation
and Systemic Risk: The Case of Electric Utilities, 28 J.L. EcoN. 671 (1985); Nowothy,
Transmission Technology and Electric Utility Regulations, 22 J. ECON. IssuEs 555 (1988);
Observers Predict Electric Proposals Will "Fundamentally Change" Industry, 121 PuB. UT.
FORT. 40 (1988); Romo, Four Days in March: When NARUC Took on the FERC, 121 Pun.
Urn. FORT. 25 (1988); Smith, Currents of Competition in Electricity Markets, 11 REG. 23
(1987); Studness, Regulations and Future Electric Power Supply, 121 PuB. Unm. FORT. 40
(1988); Teisberg, Investment Cost Recovery and Incentives for Power Plant Construction, 121
Pun. Urm. FORT. 9 (1988); Wellinghoff, The Forgotten Factorin Least-Cost Utility Planning:
Cost Recovery, 121 Pun. Urn. FORT. 9 (1988).
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More supervision should be given to marginal cost discounting, cross-subsidy
patterns, and predatory pricing to limit entry or destroy competitors. While
somewhat greater competition may be allowed and is probably desirable for
basic utility industries (at least on the margins or border lands of natural
monopolies), the underlying scale economies that require close supervision
in these industries45 still seem to be operating. Thus, we see a continuing
need for competent regulatory oversight, adequate staffing, and reasonable
integrity in basic utility operations.4s It also is important to avoid significant
extra costs and potentially inadequate service from these industries.
C.

Transportation - Highways, Railways, Airlines, and Shipping

The government spends substantial amounts of public funds for highways, bridges, airports, traffic control and safety, together with harbor,
river, and coastal waterway maintenance. In their early development, railroads received solid encouragement through land grants, and the government
still subsidizes rail passenger traffic. Although different modes of travel
partly compete against each other, the government extensively regulates each
mode. The regulatory agencies set limits and priorities on public funding.
The agencies also regulate transportation industries to maintain safety, to
organize traffic control efficiently, and to some extent, regulate, or at least
supervise pricing.
The most important and pervasive transportation regulation involves
the street and highway network, maintained through local, state, and federal
programs that are supported in part by dedicated gasoline taxes, user fees,
and licenses. 47 This grid is an integral part of urban and rural life and
meshes with land use and environmental regulation. Regulatory agencies'
handling of details may cause controversies, but all parties accept the overall
need for extensive government funding, traffic control, and long-term
planning. As public sector budgets have become strained with increasing
competition for funding, the coordination of transport spending and infrastructure maintenance is a growing challenge, and needs to be more skillfully
meshed with tax policy, allowing greater use of user charges.
Trucking should pay its fair share of road and highway maintenance,
especially the larger vehicles that impose more wear and tear on highways
and streets. Licensing and regulation for common carriers still exists, but
pricing regulation for trucking largely was dismantled at the federal level

45. Electric power, gas distribution, local telephone and water networks.
46. See Allison, supra note 32, Barber, supra note 44; Gerber, supra note 44; Howard
& Westfall, supra note 44; Joskow & Schmalense, supra note 44; Smith, supra note 44;
Trebing, supra note 1.
47. See generally AMmmcAN ASSEMBLY, THE FuTuE OF AmisRIcAN TRANSPORTATION
(1971); R. CRANDAL , H. GRUENSPEcHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGuLATiNG TIE AuToMoBILE
(1986); P. DEMPSEY & W. THoMs, LAw A ECONoMc REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION 1-48
(1986); P. KINcAiD, THE RuLE OF THE ROAD: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO HISTORY AND
PRAcTicc (1986); D. LocLiN, EcoNomcs OF TRANSPORTATION (5th ed. 1960).
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during the late 1970s deregulation.4 8 The great majority of trucks, however,
were always operated directly by small and large business, including farmers,
with only minimal licensee fees and supervision. Yet, with generous public
subsidies, the trucking industry benefits greatly in competition with rail and
water transport, particularly for heavy cargoes. The federal and state
governments could force user charges for trucking activities more effectively.
Rail transport was important before cars and trucks became commonplace, especially from the 1830s through World War I. State public service
commissions regulated railroad rates. The Interstate Commerce Commission
regulated rates more extensively, especially after the Hepburn Act of 1906.
Truck and car use mushroomed in the 1920s, but the Great Depression,
widespread excess capacity, and cutthroat rate competition led to the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 and ICC regulation of interstate common carrier
trucking. However, this regulation still left the majority of trucks operated
directly by families, farmers, and businesses largely unregulated. In the later
1970s Congress dismantled most of the ICC rate supervision for common
carrier trucking and railroads, allowing more price competition. 49 But extensive safety regulation still remains in place, along with ICC licensing for
common carrier trucking, greater supervision for railroad operations, limited
consumer protection responsibilities for the Department of Transportation.
Air travel began in the 1920s with air mail subsidies to support route
development. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) took over this responsibility, with licensing and rate supervision designed to foster airline growth
through limited competition and cross-subsidization of routes. With bigger,
faster aircraft, the airline industry flourished after World War II. Meanwhile, local communities and the federal government subsidized airport
construction and expansion, together with an improving air traffic control
system supervised by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In the
1960s and 1970s many routes became self-sustaining and the government
allowed more competition. This minor relaxing of regulation led in 1978 to
substantial airline deregulation. 0 The CAB was abolished along with rate

48. See P. DEMPSEY & W. THOmS, supra note 47, at 1-48, 80-117; P. MAcAvoY & J.
SNow, REGULATION OF ENTRY AND PRIciNG IN TRUCK TRANSPORTATION (1977); Blair, Kaserman
& McClave, Competition on Trial: Florida Deregulates Trucking, 30 CHALLENGE 60 (1987);
Gallick & Sisk, A Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation, I J. L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 117
(1987); Thorns, Rollin' On . . . To a Free Market Motor CarrierRegulation 1935-1980, 13
TRAsp. L.J. 43 (1983); Thorns, Unleashing the Greyhounds-The Bus Regulatory Act of
1982, 6 CAMPBELL L. REV. 75 (1984); Zerbe, Seattle Taxis: DeregulationHits A Pothole, 7
REGULATION 43 (1983).
49. See P. DEMPSE & W. THomS, supra note 47; G. KoIKo, RAROADS AND REGULATION,
1877-1916 (1965); D. LocKLIN, supra note 47; P. MAcAvoY, THE EcONoMIC EFFECTS OF
REGULATION: THE TRUNK-LINE RAILROAD CARTELs AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMSSION
BEFORE 1900 (1965); R. K. WEAVER, THE PoILcs OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE-RAILWAY PoLIcY
IN NORTH AMERICA (1985); Thoms, Clear Track For Deregulation of American Railroads,
1970-1980, 12 TRANsP. L. J. 183 (1982).
50. AIR.IN DEREGULATION: THE EARLY EXPERIENCE (J. Meyer & C. Oster, Jr. eds.
1981); E. BATTEY, D. GRANAm & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AnuNms
(1985); see P.
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regulation, and consumer protection responsibilities were transferred to the
Department of Transportation. A rush of new entries into the industry and
route expansion followed, with a lot of discounting on early purchase
(discretionary travel) tickets. Average fare costs dropped for some years, as
rivalry increased. Bottlenecks at many airports, however, limited competition, and many new airlines failed. Gradually, market concentration increased (in some markets higher than before deregulation), competitive
rivalry eased, and access to discount fares tightened. Average charges to
travelers began increasing substantially. What went wrong? While most
experts liked substantial deregulation, easier entry, and greater price competition, a new consensus emerged which held that there was insufficient
supervision and antitrust enforcement. In other words, for airline deregulation to work well, we need close supervision of airport bottlenecks and
the new hub networks, and tougher antitrust enforcement, including some
divestiture and transfers of routes, to limit concentration in many airport
and route markets. Airlines have imposed the largest fare price increases
on the routes with modest or no competition.
Shipping traditionally has received public subsidies through harbor and
dock improvements. Shipping also received assistance through restrictive
navigation laws to promote merchant marine and naval strength and limit
excessive reliance upon foreign shipping. Internal rivers and canals also were
improved through public subsidies. (Encouragements to railroad, highway,
and air transport were extensions of these policies.) Cities, states, and the
federal government carried these subsidies forward with special impetus
during World War II's shipbuilding effort. Since the war, however, the
United States' international shipping has declined, with businesses increasingly relying on low wage foreign flag carriers. Considerable rate cartelization applies to ocean liner "conferences", loosely supervised by federal
authorities. Tramp vessels offer lower, competitive rates. But to retain a
reasonable minimum of U.S. shipping capacity for national security purposes, the government has employed a mixture of shipbuilding subsidies,
and some traffic subsidies and protection, including the exclusion of foreign
flags from coastal waterways. Even the widespread use of foreign "flags of

DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, supra note 47; OFFICE OF TEcHNoLoGY ASSESSMENT, SAFE SKIES FOR
ToMORROw: AVIATION SAFETY IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT, (1988); W. THOMS, THE
DEREGULATION SKIEs-U.S. SUNSET LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL, (1984);

Bauer, Competition, Concentration, and Fares in the U.S., Airline Industry, FED. RES. BANK
CLEVELAND EcoN. COMMENTARY, (Sept. 15, 1987); Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulations:
Its Impact on Small Communities, 39 ArnmN. L. REV. 445 (1987); Dempsey, The Rise and
Fall of the CAB-Opening the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L. J. 91 (1979); Moore, U.S.
Airline Regulation: Its Effects on Passengers, Capital, and Labor, 29 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1986);
Jones, Airlines Deregulation:Has It Worked, 20 Bus. ECON. 11 (1985); Kahn, Surprisesfrom
Airline Deregulations, 78 Am.ECON. REV. 316 (1988); Kaplan, The Changing Airlines Industry
in Regulatory Reform: What Actually Happened, 40-77 (1986); Wilkins, Airline Deregulation:
Neoclassical Theory as Public Policy, 18 J. ECON. ISSUEs 419 (1984); Note, Airline Deregulation
and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J. 319 (1983); Valente, Flying Dinosaurs: Pan Am and
TWA Battered by Rivals, Struggle to Survive, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1988, at 1.
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convenience" for U.S. owned tankers and other cargo vessels has been
monitored and delicately supervised because this practice might be considered
a secondary mobilization reserve of U.S. international shipping capacity. 5'
The role of powerful unions52 has complicated U.S. transportation
regulation since the 1940s. These unions enjoyed strong leverage from their
potential for emergency strikes, although President Reagan's breaking of
the air controller's union in 1981 and a decline in union membership has
weakened the unions in recent years. Lately, some airlines are nonunion,
with employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). This innovation may offer
potential for less adversarial, more collaborative work relationships. But
competitive and world market pressures are greater in transportation industries lately and also affect other USA 53industries, reducing generous wagepremiums in the transportation sector.
D. Communications - Telephone, Cable, Satellite, Broadcasting, and
Postal - Delivery Services

Messenger, postal, and early semaphore telegraph services received
government encouragement for military and administrative reasons. The
government extended this encouragement to telephone and radio broadcasting services and, later, to more recent uses of broadened spectrum communications: Radar, microwave, satellite, and extensive coding and
computerization activities. Because commercial and private use is generally
much larger than governmental use for most communication services, extensive market opportunities emerged. Some opportunities were rather monopolistic, but with increasing technical progress, more of the communications
sector is becoming competitive. Nonetheless, the government still regulates
the less competitive portions of the industry to ensure technical reliability,
meet national security needs, and to promote fairness, easy access, and
educational development in a federal democracy.
The telephone service industry has been the most monopolistic communications industry, with longstanding AT&T dominance and natural
monopolies still operating for local phone companies. Until recently, the
long distance telephone industry was also monopolistic. Microwave towers,
however, increased cable and transmitter capacity, and communications
satellites in orbital slots above the earth allowed new competitors like MCI
to offer reliable, cheaper long distance phone service. This changing technology market allowed many independents into the field once antitrust court
decisions assured MCI (and others) of access and hookups to the local Bell

51. See E.

FRANKEL, REGULATION AND POLICIES OF AMERiCAN SHIPING

(1982); N.

FimuDAN, THE U.S. MARrrIME STRATEoy (1988).

52. These unions include railroad brotherhoods, maritime and dockworkers' unions,
airline and air controller unions, and the Teamsters' Union for a large part of the trucking
industry.
53. See P. DzmsEy & W. THOMS, supra note 47, at 297-311. See also Bauer, supra note
50; Moore, supra note 50; Wilkins, supra note 50; Valente, supra note 50.
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phone monopolies. Similarly, independent subsystem and component suppliers were allowed access, and these companies' cheaper interconnections,
phones and equipment permitted them to undercut the Bell system's monopoly prices. When it seemed likely that Judge Harold Green would decide
in favor of the Justice Department antitrust prosecution and divest AT&T's
phone system from AT&T's Western Electric subsidiary and Bell Labs,
AT&T preferred to accept divestiture of its local Bell system monopolies.
Thus, AT&T, shorn of natural monopolies, became a competitive firm in
the long distance telephone, telecommunications equipment, and R&D markets. But regional Bell monopolies remain established in markets for local
service. Continued, strong antitrust supervision is still needed for access,
interconnection, and the prevention of anticompetitive practices by these
local phone companies and AT&T, the leading long distance phone com54
pany.
Broadcast regulation began with allocations of the radio frequencies.
The federal government sought to minimize interference and reserve frequencies for military, police, emergency, and other public needs. The
government extended licensing and limited regulation from radio stations to
television stations after World War II. Somewhat more regulation followed
to limit concentration of media ownership, improve programming quality,
achieve fair access, and promote educational and public service goals. Cable
television developed as a means to extend the range of broadcasting to less
populated areas. With great improvements in cable and satellite technology,
new cable networks developed to challenge the big three broadcasters. This
development of cable TV led to extensive attachment of cable wiring to
established telephone power service hookups (poles and underground conduits). In urban areas, local governments offer cable TV franchises to local
regulated monopolies. Some experts question whether exclusivity is needed
now. Some rate regulation applies to these franchise systems where competition is weak, and significant antitrust enforcement is needed for more
5
concentrated media markets.

54. See S. CoLu, THE DEAL OF Tim CENTURY: TE BREAKUP OF AT&T (Ist ed. 1986);
A. DANIELSON & D. KAMESCHEN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THrE POST-DIvEsTIuTRE ERA (1986);
Crandall, Surprises from Telephone Deregulation and the AT&T Divestiture, 78 AM. ECON.
REv. 323 (1988); Dingell, Nulty, & McCarthy, ...

Or aFreeRide for AT&T? 27 CHALLENGE

30 (1984); Jost & Tolin, Who Will Regulate Utility-Owned Fibre-Optic Networks? The States
or the FCC?, 121 PUB. UTI. FORT. 32 (1988); Kahn, A Needed Dose of Competition ....
27 CHALLENGE 24 (1984); Kahn & Shaw, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation:
Pricing, 4 YALE J. ON PEG. 191 (1987); Mansell, The Telecommunications Bypass Threat, 20
J. EcoN. ISSUES 145 (1986); Militzer & Wolf, Deregulation in Telecommunications, 20 Bus.

EcON. 27 (1985); Trebing, Apologetics of Deregulation in Energy and Telecommunications:
An InstitutionalistAssessment, 20 J. ECON. IssuEs 613 (1986).

55. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMeRCE, REPORT ON FAIRNESS N BROADCASTING
ACT OF 1987, (1987); D. ALTaEiDE, MEDIA PowER (1985); S. BENSEN, MISnULATxa TELEVISION NETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE FCC (1984); I. STEIN, CABE TELEVISION: HANDBOOK
AND FoRMs (1985) L.A.S. PowE, AMEmCAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987);
J. TuRow, MEDIA INDUSTmrES: Tim PRODUCTION OF NEws AND ENTERTANMENT (1984); H.
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Mail delivery became an early, subsidized public service in the United
States, although more competition exists now from parcel service companies
like UPS and higher cost, fast delivery services like Federal Express, Emery
and others. The basic, local delivery and collection of mail and small
packages via the U.S. Postal Service is now largely selfsupporting. Rate
regulation is needed, however, to price access to this network and review
cross-subsidation, discounts for books and educational materials, preaddressed advertising, and government, international, and family service.
Routine business communications, notices, bills and customer payments
require a massive, low cost, but generally reliable mail or equivalent delivery
system. Almost all mail, in fact, does get through to its destination, although
substantial premiums can be charged to insure guaranteed prompt delivery
56
and authenticated receipts.
E. Environmental - Land Use, Zoning, Pollution, and Waste Control
Local governments used limited zoning in early city development and
planning, along with restrictions in the more affluent suburbs. This zoning
included modest park spaces, museums, zoos, and other cultural amenities.
With today's greater affluence and concentrated urban populations, substantial improvements in parks, sports facilities, historic and cultural places
are now commonplace. Sophisticated land use, growth planning, and regional zoning became routine for urban areas and spread to many rural
communities. Quality of results varies, but the overall attractiveness of an
area is clearly an important dimension of rivalry for economic growth, high
tech work forces, and locational choices for new plants, business and
talented young people. Even modest improvements are popular politically
and comprise part of the achievement agendas for local and state leaders.
Significant resources in local, state, and, to a lesser degree, federal budgets
are being allocated for these purposes. 5 7

ZucKAwN & M. GAYNES, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN A NUTSHELL, (3rd ed. 1988); Coase,

The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1959); Lee, Antitrust Enforce-

ment, Freedom of the Press, and the "Open Market". The Supreme Court on the Structure
and Conduct of Mass Media, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1249 (1978); Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169 (1978);
Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and Interactive Cable Technology: The
Case for Minimal Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 565 (1983).
56. D. ADm, MONOPOLY MAIL: PRIVATIZING TH UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (1989);
J. FL.EISMN, THE FUTURE OF POSTAL SERVICE (1983); PERSPECTIVES ON POSTAL SERVICE ISSUES
(R. Sherman ed. 1980).
57. D. BROWER & D. CAROL, MANAGING LAND-UE CONFLICTS (1987); C. COCKLN, B.
SMITH, & T. JOHNSON, DEMANDS ON RURAL LANDS: PLANNING FOR RESOURCE USE (1987);
ELICKSON & TARLOCK, LAND-UsE CONTROLS (1981);W. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING
LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AmERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS (1985); C. HAAR,
LAND USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-UsE OF URBAN LAND (3d ed.
1977); HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, HORNBOOK ON URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
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Pollution used to be accepted as an unavoidable blight in some rivers,
industrial neighborhoods, and suburbs that more affluent people could
avoid by relocating to nicer residential areas or nearby countryside. Most
of the country remained relatively unspoiled and suitable for normal agricultural, ranching, or woodland usage. Farsighted idealists, however, began
to set aside some of the most beautiful natural sites as national or state
parks. The conservation movement added popularity to this endeavor, along
with scouting and summer camps for young people. The federal government
made extensive park and historic site improvements in the New Deal era,
partly to utilize unemployed labor.

Further progress along these lines followed World War II, but by the
late 1960s, more serious pollution became increasingly obvious. The country
faced nasty air quality and smog problems, and dying rivers and lakes. A
bit later, the nation experienced growing alarm at hazardous chemical and

nuclear wastes, together with overloads in solid waste disposal in the most
heavily populated regions of the country. Since the 1970s people in the
United States and many other nations have become far more environmentally
conscious, and widely have sought substantial progress in cleaning up our
58
natural environment.

LAND POLICY FOR THE 1980's: THE MESSAGE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (G. Lefcoe
ed. 1983); M. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE CoMUI'TY BULDERS: THE AMERiCAN REAL ESTATE
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AMERICAN BUSINESS DHmEmAs OF COMPLIANCE (1986); ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980'S:
REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA (N. Vig & M. Draft eds. 1984); FINDLEY & FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL
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Common-law nuisance suits proved weak in practice, but some successful
ad hoc and class action litigations were followed by creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Clean Air and Clean Water legislation in the early 1970s. The government imposed mandatory standards
to maintain, and in more troubled areas, to improve the quality of air and
water. Better technology was sought for industry and automobiles and, in
some respects, required. Lots of litigation ensued, with affected industries
generally wanting relaxation of environmental standards, and environmentalists demanding stronger action. Some economists suggested auction-type
licenses for pollution, allocated by market prices, so that only the most
socially valuable industrial activities would pollute congested areas. Modest
leeway along these lines was being allowed, although general restrictions
against pollutants were more common remedies. By the late 1980s there was
considerable progress in reducing air pollution, especially from auto emissions and the movement of noxious factories to lower wage countries.
Rivers, lakes, and seashores were harder to clean up, but limited progress
also occurred in this direction.
Chemical and nuclear waste control was more difficult to handle, and
preliminary waste site selection represented only modest progress. Although
some of the most dangerous chemicals and pesticides were banned, no
strong consensus on dangerous materials, their treatment, or their removal
had developed at that point. Even so, the public clearly wanted stronger
limits on waste dumping and, if possible, improved treatment technology.
Some poor areas volunteered themselves as chemical waste disposal sites,
but nuclear wastes remained a political hot potato. A garbage barge from
Long Island could not find a home away from home, despite a wellpublicized odyssey thousands of miles into the Gulf of Mexico-. Federalism
and growing public anxieties greatly complicated the chemical-nuclear waste
mess, but tougher regulation in some form was predictable.
Even solid waste dumping of trash was a growing dilemma in the most
populated Northeastern and other big city areas. Although dumping in low
population areas or at sea found favor as a stop gap measure, other states
were being less receptive to requests to take the big cities' garbage. Meanwhile, run-offs and dumping into oceans became a notorious problem for
the areas of the Mediterranean, North Sea, northeastern United States, and
Inland Sea of Japan. Many lakes in industrial countries had deteriorated
badly by now, and greater international collaboration became necessary.
Remedies for environmental pollution require improved technology,
better accountability, more market like rationality, and yet stronger regulation. But many facts are greatly disputed and expert estimates diverge
widely. This makes careful planning more difficult and tends to emotionalize

Butterfield, Idaho Governor Is Firm on Blocking Atomic Waste, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988,
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the politics of environmental regulation. Experts divide into industry versus

environmental camps, although a large public majority want somewhat
stronger policies. But political parties have reacted more favorably to
environmental concerns, and
generally promised to be proenvironment in
59
the later 1980s and beyond.
F.

Depletable Resources - Energy, Forests, Fisheries and Wildlife.

Throughout history societies often have exhausted valuable resources
and thus limited their prosperity. Although some resource depletion is

unavoidable over the long run, wiser nations plan more carefully, limit
waste, and arrange resource substitutes within a reasonable time. Improvidence brings penalties of disruption, and perhaps even suffering. The more

affluent and younger nations like the United States, with natural abundance
during most of their history, frequently are extravagant. But so far, the
U.S. has enjoyed good luck, with enough new technology and increased
imports to sustain prosperity; although U.S. economic growth has slowed
since the 1970s. In contrast, the economies of Japan, Switzerland, and W.
Germany have their retained forward momentum recently through somewhat
greater self-discipline in their use of natural resources. 60 Rather troubling,
though, in the mid to late 1980s, was a large U.S. trade deficit, one third

of which came from oil imports and renewed dependence on foreign
61
petroleum.

59. See, e.g., Changing Colour, TnE ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 15.
Green is the world's new political colour. Pollution is an issue in America's
presidential campaign, for the first time ever. Some of Mikhail Gorbachev's recent
speeches have put almost as much stress on ekologia as on perestroika. Deng
Xiaoping, puffing on his 30th cigarette of the day, says that China's burgeoning
industry is creating too much smog. Margaret Thatcher has begun to worry about
the ozone layer ....
Now, in the rich countries, people increasingly tell opinion
pollsters that they are unhappy about the environment: about noise and filth, but
also about the possibility that they are doing lasting harm to the fabric of the world
that their children will inherit.
Id. For further discussion about politicians' environmental concerns, see The Environmental
Presidents,TEm ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1988, at 32 (reporting that both Bush and Dukakis support
proenvironmental goals with considerable detail).
60. See D. Born & W. QUANDT, ENERGY SECURTnY IN nm 1980's: ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTES (1984); R. H. CARNEGIE, OUTLOOK FOR MINERAL CoMMIorrms (1986);
H. LANDSBERG, ENERGY, TBE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (1979); Braetigarn & Hubbard, Natural
Gas: The Regulatory Transition, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED, supra
note 1, at 137-68; Hubbard & Weiner, Petroleum Regulation in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT

supra note 1, at 105-36. For a report of recent stronger economic
performance in Japan, West Germany, and Switzerland, see OECD ECONOMIC OunTOOK, supra
note 4; see also LovETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY, supra note 4, at Table P-2.
61. See Fri, Changing Times for Oil Imports and Energy Policy, 87 RESOURCES 1 (1987);
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF IEA COUNTRES, 1978 REvrEw
(1979); INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY BALANCES OF OECD COUNTRIES, 1970-85 (1987; INT'L
ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF IEA COUNTRIES, 1986 REvmw (1987).
United States' oil imports have increased in volume, raising import dependence to fifty percent,
ACTUALLY HAPPENED,
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Extensive U.S. resource waste came with the clear cutting, and even
burning, of forests, especially across the northeastern and midwestern tier
of states. The government gradually imposed conservation measures that,
along with better replanting and management techniques, saved considerable
timber capacity. Controversy still exists about the extent to which the
government should allow rapid exploitation of timber areas. Logging interests want more cutting, while conservationists and scenic beauty and wildlife

organizations want to save forests, even at the expense of increased logging
costs. At issue is the trade off between short-term sales and profits and
longer-term environmental interests and future supplies. Forest and park

management, along with logging regulation, should strive for reasonable
balance.

62

Heavy hunting and deforestation depleted many wildlife species, includ-

ing bison, bears, deer, and eagles. Overfishing occurred in many states. The
regulation of hunting and fishing and park and forest management, and

the restocking efforts by departments of fisheries and wildlife have saved
considerable numbers of fish and even a few animal populations. Fish and
seafood farming are becoming important, too. Ocean fishing also needs

more regulation, not only to save endangered species like whales and seals,
63
but to provide fair access to seafood on a more crowded planet.
The regulation of oil, gas, coal, and other energy industries needed to
sustain prosperity and economic growth is another important area of regulation. 64 With generous free market incentives for exploitation (unlike many
since the big drop of world oil prices in 1986. Unfortunately, the world oil surplus may be
only medium-term and U.S. oil reserves are limited. If another OPEC III oil price shock
occurs, the impact on U.S. oil import costs may be severe. Either the United States must
accept significantly larger trade deficits, or the United States must cut its nonoil imports
sharply. Such a cut inevitably would depress the world economy again as a similar cut did in
1981-82.
62. See D. C.ARY, TrMBER AND T
FOREST SERVICE (1986); W. ROBBINS, AMEUCAN
FORESTRY: A HISTORY OF NATIONAL, STATE, AND PRIVATE COOPERATION (1985); R. SEDO,
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countries where minerals are state owned), the U.S. unleashed strong domestic production, and extensive overseas exploitation by its leading oil and
gas companies. Although worries about resource depletion and insufficient
supply came periodically during the early 1920s, World War II and the
immediate post war years, and the OPEC heyday from 1973 to 1980, new
fields, deeper drilling, offshore exploitation, and diversified foreign production yielded new supplies of oil and natural gas. These new developments
also led to more effective conservation measures in the last fifteen years.
Nonetheless, expanded U.S. oil imports strain the nation's balance of
payments. The United States should make greater conservation efforts, like
those efforts made in Japan and Europe, with greater emphasis on cleaner
coal and renewable energy for the longer run. The drastic U.S. shift in the
1970s toward nuclear energy and increased coal use (without very effective
scrubbers) that seemed essential in the OPEC squeeze period, lost some
urgency with an oil-gas surplus in the 1980s. We should not, however, waste
this breathing room. Tougher conservation measures still make sense to
improve the U.S. balance of payments and to allow more leisurely progress
toward cleaner coal (of which the United States has a large long-term
supply), more efficient, safer use of other energy sources such as solar,
wind, water, geothermal and nuclear energy, and longer term breakthroughs
in technology, including super-conductivity in power transmission.
Sound resource development and conservation make sense for other
strategic minerals and metals that are important for national prosperity and
security. While efficiency and incentives are always desirable, the sad history
of previous U.S. extravagance teaches that better accountability and longterm planning along with sufficient support for scientific and engineering
progress, usually can make a valuable contribution. Regulation and stewardship for depletable resources, over the long run, is common sense.
Market discipline should be combined with regulatory oversight.
G. Agricultural Regulation
From colonial times through the Nineteenth Century, the majority of
Americans worked in the farming or rural economy. Most of these farmers
operated farms, although large plantations flourished in the South before
the Civil War. There were 13 million farms in the U.S. at the time of the
Great Depression in a country with a population of 130 million. Approximately half the people in the country still lived on farms or in rural
communities. Chronic surpluses, low prices, and reduced incomes for farmers were big problems. Federal price supports and production quotas were
needed to relieve the agricultural economy. They were supplemented by
USDA programs to encourage farm co-ops for purchasing fertilizer, seed,
and supplies and marketing supplemented the price supports and production
quotas. The government sponsored better farming techniques, and rural
electrification. Although World War II shortages improved prices considerably, limited surpluses returned in post war years. Meanwhile, similar
measures were employed in most of the world to promote more self-
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sufficiency among farmers and strengthen incomes among peasants and
65
farmers in many nations.

Meanwhile, U.S. agriculture was changing. Farm sizes increased greatly
and relatively few small farms survived, except to provide supplementary
income or semi-residential properties. In the late 1980s only two million

full-time farms remain. Large, and often corporate, farms carry on the
majority of production. While price subsidies and output quotas continue
on a few basic commodities, at considerable expense to the federal government, the political constituency for generous subsidies is smaller and weaker.
Reagan farm policies moved toward freer markets and reduced subsidies,
although farm lobbies still mustered clout in Congress through a network
of rural Senators and Representatives.
In many ways agricultural prices, marketing, and surpluses are now

international trade policy problems. 66 The Green Revolution in India and
in many LDCs reduced demand for U.S. farm exports. Farm policies in
most countries, including the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, featured
agricultural subsidies, encouraged output and exports, and led to recent

surpluses and low prices in world markets. The Reagan administration
sought freer market farm policies and reduced subsidies everywhere, but
farm lobbies were stronger in many other countries. Progress in this direction
65. J. BADEN, TE VANIsHING FARmLAND CRISIS: CRIncAL VIEws OF THE MOVEMENT TO
PRESERVE AGRICULTURAL LAND (1984); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PUBLIC POLICY AND
THE CHANGING STRUCTUn OF AMERICAN AoRICULTURE (1978); J. CONNOR, R. ROGERS, B.
MARION & W. MUELLER, Tas FOOD MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1985); D. HATHAWAY,
AGRICULTURE A" THE GATT: RETHINKING TH RULES (1987); D. HATHAWAY, FARm CoMMODIY PROGRAMS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE (1973); D. HATHAWAY, GOVERNMENT AND
AGRICULTURE: PUBLIC POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOcIETY (1963); J. JUERGENSMEYER & J.
WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW (1982); J. Opm, THE LAW OF THE LAND: Two HUNDRED YEARS
OF AMERICAN FARMLAND POLICY (1987); J. PADDOCK, SOIL AND SURVIVAL: LAND STEWARDSHIP
AND THE FUrTURE OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE (1986).

66. To appreciate current world trade problems in agriculture, the reader must realize

that most major nations also subsidize agriculture. And yet U.S. agriculture, with larger farms,
is naturally more efficient than most European or Japanese agriculture. See, e.g., CoNGREsSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND IMPI CATIONS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE (1986); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
JAPANESE IMPORT BARRIERS TO U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (1986); D. BALAAm, FOOD POLmCs:
THE REGIONAL CONFLICT (1981); A. BucKNELL, D. HARVEY, K. JOHNSON & K. PARTON, THE
COSTS OF THE COMMON AGUCULTURAL POLICY (1982); F. DUCHENE, E. SzczEPANIK & W.
LEGG, NEW LIMITS ON EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE, POLITICS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY (1985); R. FENNELL, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE EUROPE N CoMMuNTY
(1979); THE FUTURm OF TE NORTH AMERICAN GRANARY (C. Ford Runge, ed. 1986); B.
GARDNER, U.S. AGRICULTRE POLICY: THE 1985 FARM LEGISLATION (1985); S. HARRS, A.
SWINBANK, & G. WnxINSON, THE FOOD AND FARMPOLICIES OF TE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1983); B. HILL, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTUn (1984); H.
DR HOEN, G. JOHNSON & S. TANoaRMAN, AGRICULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1985); J. MARsH & P. SwANNEI,
AGRICULTURE AND THE EUROPE"
CommuNITr
(1980); A. McCALLA & T. JOSLING, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND WORLD MARKETS (1985); R.
PAARLBERG, INDIA, TIm SOVIET UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES (1985); J. SorLoFn, THE

PoLmCs OF FOOD (1985); C. P. TIMMER, THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY
(1986).
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has remained slow. Many experts believe that an international cap on
subsidies is the most attainable medium-term result, and that any general
elimination of subsidies abroad is unrealistic. 67
Other agricultural regulatory issues exist. 68 First, how much "good"
farm land should be preserved and kept free of residential and commercial
development? Because the population will expand substantially, some commentators urge rural zoning to keep the more productive crop land for
agriculture while using hillier, more marginal land for other purposes.
Second, public lands and water rights "competition" is increasing in the
Western states, with more conflicts between developers, agriculture, ranching, forestry, and environmental-parkland interests. Third, increased foreign
investment and the buying of large U.S. farms has raised concerns for many
rural communities about limits on purchases and the danger of absentee
owners. State laws have established disclosure requirements and restrictions,
while a weak dollar in the later 1980s increased the flow of foreign
investment to buy farm lands. Fourth, agricultural credit had been strengthened with the Federal Land Bank and related facilities set up in the Great
Depression. But a sag in land-crop prices during the 1980s stressed this
credit system, resulting in widespread farm bankruptcies and foreclosures.
Many U.S. farms were lost in this period, raising questions about the
adequacy of price and income supports and credit facilities for family farms
over the long-term. Fifth, environmental worries about pesticides and other
chemicals affecting agriculture and its production have received greater
attention and sparked continuing regulatory controversy.
H.

IndustrialDevelopment and Technology

Most countries try to encourage industrial development and technical
progress. United States policy always has stressed these goals, but the mix
has shifted considerably since World War II. Free internal markets, fairly
easy credit (with occasional surges of speculative excess often followed by
recession), considerable protection against manufactured imports, patents
for new inventions, and relatively low taxes were the traditional U.S. policies
for industrial - technical advance. 69 But World War II brought substantially
higher taxes which continued through the Cold War, with sizeable defense
outlays,70 and considerably higher civilian government outlays. Nearly half

67. In fact, Japan, many Common Market, and most British Commonwealth nations
argued in recent trade negotiations that United States efforts to force a complete free market
in world agriculture might be counterproductive and not conducive to realistic limitations on
surpluses for greater price stability.
68. See supra notes 62, 65, 66.
69. For earlier U.S. policy supporting industrial development, see J. GARRATY, supra
note 8; J. HICKS, THE A.M micAN NAnON (1946); J. HicKs, THE FEDERAL UNION (2d ed. 1952);
W. LovTT, supra note 4, at 23-37, nn. 1-31; P. STuDNsi & H. KRoos, FIAcI.L HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1-435 (2d ed. 1963).
70. These defense outlays constituted 9-10% of the GNP from 1951 to 1969 and 5-6.5
% of GNP from 1975 to 1988.
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of these higher taxes were payroll taxes that supported social security
payments. 7 ' Fiscal and monetary policy has remained fairly stimulative,
except during periods of tightening (especially 1980-82) when the Federal
Reserve halted inflationary momentum with very high interest rates. Unfortunately, large budget deficits between 1983-88 kept U.S. interest rates
financial and industrial
higher than the rates in the United States' leading
72
rivals Japan, West Germany, and Switzerland.
Trade policy gradually shifted toward more open markets in the postwar
years.73 Initially, this reduction in trade barriers was balanced between the
United States and major trade partners. But since the 1970s, a bigger U.S.
trade deficit has reflected greater openness in the U.S. than in its major
trade partners, Japan, Europe, Canada, and the countries in Latin America.
With respect to low wage nations, GATT has entrenched a double standard;
infant industry protection and extensive subsidies have been allowed for
developing nations, but not for nations like the United States. Although
Japan grew rapidly from a poorer nation to a wealthier nation with hard
work and mercantilist industrial policies, it has remained much less open
to U.S. manufacturers. Meanwhile, Japanese companies skillfully have
blended components from low wage countries to keep their export prices
competitive. Manufactured exports from NICs and LDCs have flowed into
71. For postwar policies, see J. GARRATY, supra note 8; J. HICKS, THE AMERICAN
NATION, supra note 55; J. HICKS, THE FEDERAL UNION, supra note 55; W. LovEnr, INFLATION
AND PoLTmcs: FISCAL, MONETARY, AND WAGE-PRICE DISCIPL'NE (1982); Lov-r, supra note 4,
at 37-61, 189-201; H. STEIN, PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMCS, supra note 24; P. STuDENSKI & H.
KRoos, supra note 55, at 436-568.
72. See W. GREIDER, SECRETS OF rH TEMLE: How m FEDERAL RESERVE RuNs THE
COUNTRY (1987); D. KEI-rL, LEADERSH= AT THE FED (1986); W. LovErr, BANKING AND
FINANCIAL INsTITnoNs LAW, supra note 38, at 62-109; W. LOVErr, WORLD TRADE RrvALRY,
supra note 4, at 189-204, Tables 4-2, 4-3; T. MAYER, J. DUESENBERRY & R. ALMER, supra
note 24; H. STEIN, PRESIDENTIAL EcoNoiucs, supra note 24. For recent U.S. interest rates,
see FED. REs. BANK OF ST. Louis, U.S. FINANCIAL DATA. For comparative international interest
rates, see MORGAN GuARANTY TRUST COMPANY, WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS.

U.S. federal budget deficits for fiscal years ending September 30 were as follows:
1980-$ 73.8b.
1981-$ 78.9b.
1982-$127.9b.
1983-$207.8b.
1984-$185.3b.
1985-S212.3b.
1986-$221.2b.
1987-$149.7b.
1988-$155.lb
Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision, and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. (1988).
73. See generally K. KOCK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND IHE GATT, 1947-1967
(1969); D. LANoNT, FORCING OUR HAND: AMERICA'S TRADE WARS IN TH 1980's (1986); W.
LovErr, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY, supra note 4; F. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY
(1978); J. PECK, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
SINCE 1850 (1983).
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the U.S. at an increasing rate, and many American corporations have
relocated part of their manufacturing operations to low wage countries.
Although U.S. patent monopolies are still attainable on new inventions, the
monopolies have become less significant than they had been because research
and development and industrial expansion in the United States has slowed
down greatly. This less favorable environment for U.S. industrial development in recent years helps explain overall economic sluggishness during the
last 15 years.
In contrast, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have enjoyed rapid
industrial growth and improving technology with a more favorable mix of
lower taxes, easier credit, greater protection against foreign manufactures,
and a stronger research and development effort.7 4 Increasing U.S. public
and Congressional concern since the mid 1980s has focused on the trade
equity issue. Tougher U.S. trade policy might be forthcoming, and substantial domestic support now exists for an end to unequal openness. Also,
most experts have agreed that U.S. federal deficits were excessive between
1983-88 when they reached a total of $1,000 billion. These deficits raised
U.S. interest rates, overvalued the dollar, weakened exports, and encouraged
excessive imports. In this way, unbalanced macroeconomic policies have
aggravated problems of industrial competitiveness.7 5
During the last fifteen years important debates raged among the slower
growing, less successful nations. 76 The question of how to achieve progress
quickly like pacesetters Japan, West Germany, Taiwan, South Korea offers
no easy answers. Industrial policies have been successful, within limits,
among the best performers. Whether societies with less cohesion or greater
pluralism could emulate the successful countries is uncertain.7 7 A helping

74. See W. LOVETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY, supra note 4, at 1-15, 75-96 (collecting
extensive sources on economic growth policies of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea); see also
0. BELASSA & M. NOLAND, JAPAN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1988); D. HALBERSTAM, Tan
RECKONING (1986); R. HOPHEINZ, JR. & K. CALDER, Tim EAST ASIA EDGE: WHY AN ENTn
REGION IS OVERTAKING THE WEST IN TECHNOLOGY, EXPORTS, AND MANAGEMENT (1982); C.
JOHNSON, MITI AND Tan JAPANESE MIRcL, 1925-1975 (1982); T. McCRAw, AMERICA VERSUS
JAPAN (1986); K. YA .AmmRA, ECONOMIC POLICY IN PosTwAR JAPAN: GROWTH VERSUS ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY (1967); K. YAMAmuRA, POLICY AND TRADE ISSUES Or TIa JAPANESE ECONOMY

(1982); van Wolferen, The Japan Problem, 65 FOREIGN An'. 288 (1986-87).
75. See R. BRYANT, ExTENAL DEFIcrrs AND THE DOLLAR: THE PIT AND THE PENDULUM
(1988); J. FAUX, GETTING RID OF THE TRADE DEFICIT: A CHEAPER DoLAR Is NOT ENOUGH
(1988); W. LOVErr, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY, supra note 4; S. MARURs, DEFICITS AND THE
DOLLAR (1987).

76. See F.G. ADAMS & L. KLEIN, INDUSTRIAL POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND COMPETIVENNSS
(1982); S. COHEN & J. ZYSMAN, MANUFACTURING MATTERS: TH MYTH OF THE PosT-INDusTmLm
ECONOMY (1987); COMPETITION IN GLOBAL INDUSTIES (M. Porter ed. 1986); K. PHI.LIS,
STAYING ON Top: THE BusnEss CASE FOR A NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY (1984); L. THUROw,
THE ZERO-SUM SOLTrION: BULDING A WORL-CLAss AMERICAN ECONOMY (1985); see also W.
LOVETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY, supra note 4, at 75-135.

77. See supra note 76. Increasing attention has been focused upon the United States'
trade policy since World War II which sponsored trade by offering increasing access to U.S.
markets and brought unequal openness in the 1970s and 1980s. See M. CzmnKoTA, ExPoRT
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hand from a skillful government with dynamic, world-market-oriented industrial vitality has worked well. But a heavy hand from repressive or
inefficient bureaurcatic governments is not the answer. "Lemon socialism"
and costly bailouts for sick factories or industries is unproductive industrial
policy. Blind faith in unrestrained capitalism, where things are not working
well or where too many actors have been cut out of the game or victimized
by neglect, has not proven highly productive either. Important lessons have
been accumulating on successful industrial and export development strategies. First, broader research and development efforts are needed with
financing support or tax relief to promote success. Second, export enhancement, limited subsidies, and world market agressiveness are helpful. Third,
offsets to foreign trade restrictions, mercantilism, subsidies, and extensive
discounting in world markets are justified and often necessary to promote
a nation's own industrial development. Fourth, teamwork and strong incentives that are important for sustained industrial development require widespread sharing in the profits of economic growth. Finally, the proof of
success for industrial development strategies is the overall rate of economic
growth and wide sharing of benefits in the expansion process.
L Labor Markets and Professions
A skilled work force is an indispensable complement to industrial
development and higher technology. To achieve a skilled work force, a
country needs a strong, well-disciplined educational system, good labor
mobility and training networks, and a macroindustrial policy environment
that fosters productivity and fuller employment. Reasonable continuity
should be encouraged, but considerable turnover and relocation must be
expected in modern family life. People naturally seek their best opportunities. One's best opportunity often includes a major move and the search
for variety in work roles. Healthy educational, training, and labor markets
allow flexibility, but also ensure competence, productivity, and reasonable
fulfillment for most people. Fair treatment is highly desirable, and undue
rigidity, shortages, or surpluses should be minimized. Artificial scarcity,
overcharging and exploitation of the vulnerable are maladjustments. A
society that takes pride in general achievement and prosperity is more likely
78
to sustain progress.
PROMOTI ON: THE PrvATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR (1983); R. DA.,
AINrT-Dutmlo IN A LIBERAL
TRADE ORDER (1980); G. HUFBAUER & J. ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1984); D.
LAMONT, supra note 73; W. LoVETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY, supra note 4, chs. 2, 3, 6

(including discussion of alternative responses to foreign industrial policies, extensive subsidies,
widespread surpluses and discounting, and unequal openness); C. PREsTownrz, TRADING
PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LrAD (1988).
78. For discussions of goals for an industrial relations system, see J. DUnLoP, THE
INDUsTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM (1958); T. KocHa, H. KATZ & R. McKEsIm, THlE TwSORMATIoN OF AmERIcAN INDUSTIAL RELATIONS (1986); LABOR AND Tm NATIONAL ECONOMY (W.
Bowen ed. 1965); R. MARSHALL, UNHEARD VoICES: LABOR AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN A
CoMPETrrvE WORLD (1987); see also R. LEvEMNG, A GREAT PLACE TO WORK: WAT MAKES

SOME EMPLOYERS So GOOD (AND MOST So BAD) (1988) (discussing outlook of workers and
their families about employment situations and job roles); S. TERKEL, WORKING (1974) (same).
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When the great majority of people were employed in agrarian life,
family businesss or craft occupations, basic education, literacy, and normal
contract law sufficed. But industrial production became widespread, and
eventually, the great majority of people worked in bigger organizations like
large farms, mining, manufacturing, and distribution businesses, service and
finance businesses, local, state, and federal government, or the military. In
this new environment the problems of management-employee relations became unavoidable. A variety of relationships emerged, partly competing
with each other, yet building upon the accumulated gains and customs that
evolved in the regulation of labor markets and professions.
Democratic trade unions and collective bargaining with large employers
and corporations gradually developed in the late nineteenth, early twentieth
centuries. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 supported unionization,
and the NLRB received authority to correct unfair labor practices by
employers. World War II mobilization brought tight labor markets and the
War Labor Board gave further encouragement to unions and contract
settlements to minimize strikes and disruptions. By the early 1950s one
fourth of the U.S. labor force was unionized. Even nonunion employees
were helped by a trend toward higher wages, improved benefits, and more
extensive pensions. Broadly similiar unionization, often with higher union
shares of labor forces, occured in Europe, the Commonwealth countries,
and even Japan (although company unions were preferred by the Japanese).
Collective bargaining was seen as social progress and largely inevitable, with
some regulation of wages, hours, and working conditions along the way.
By the 1960s this social compromise seemed nicely entrenched. 79 Political
parties enjoying substantial trade union support usually governed among
the prosperous industrial democracies. During the 1970s, however, greater
wage and price inflation reduced public confidence in unions, increased tax
burdens caused taxpayers substantial disgruntlement, and in some countries
unions became irresponsible, staging wildcat strikes and making excessive
wage demands. During the 1980s inflationary momentum was broken by
sustained monetary restraint and a worldwide recession that considerably
increased unemployment. Unions weakened substantially in the United States,
and to a lesser extent in other industrial democracies. Other factors were
long-term economic growth, improved prosperity, and higher education
levels. A younger generation felt less antagonistism toward employers, found
unions less attractive, and preferred a teamwork oriented relationship in the
workplace. 80

79. For a discussion of the 1960s consensus on labor relations, see H. NoRTHRUp & G.
BLOOM, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN UNION-MANAGEMENT

RELA-

(1963); J. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR (1966); L. REYNOLDS, LABOR
ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS (6th ed. 1974). But see Tasini, Why Labor Is At Odds with
the N.L.R.B., N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, at F4, col. 1.
80. For summaries of the inflation problem from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, see
R. FLANAGAN, D. SOSKICE & L. ULLMAN, UNIONISM, ECONOhIC STABILIZATION, AND INCOMES
POLICIES (1983); W. LOVETT, INFLATION AmD PoITICS: FISCAL, MONETARY AND WAGE-PRICE
TIONS
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Most of the New Deal and postwar network of labor law concerning
unions and collective bargaining remains on the books, but is less important
now. Only seventeen percent of the U.S. work force is unionized. Organized
labor is less potent politically, and the Reagan administration was openly

antiunion. Reagan's administration ruthlessly broke the air traffic controllers' union, and the NLRB became more pro-employer. Meanwhile, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) became rather popular. The majority

of Americans like profitsharing in one form or another and seek a bigger
stake in their jobs, companies or organizations. Pensions and health benefits
are taken very seriously, however, and employee representation for these

purposes is still necessary, whether through unions, ESOP trusteees, or
other modes of representation. Most people also now realize that better

productivity, work discipline, and quality control are needed in a more
competitive world market."'
A final change of importance for labor markets is the increase in
"professionalism" 2 . In our increasingly sophisticated workplace force, using

DisciIuN

(1982); THE PoLmcs OF INF_.ATION AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION (L. Lindberg & C.
Maier eds. 1985). Gradually, by the later 1980s there was a weakening of union support among
working people. See, e.g., KocHAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
(1986); Beyond Unions, Bus. WK., July 8, 1985, at 72; Craver, The Vitality of the American
Labor Movement in the 21st Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 633 (1983) Smart Machines, Smart
People: 'Gold Collar' Force Vital to Automation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1988, at Dl, col. 1.
Even people sympathetic to unions felt more obligation to stress productivity and greater profit
sharing. Kuttner, A ProgressiveLabor Agenda After Reagan, 31 CHALLENG, Sept./Oct. 1988,
at 4. Others suggested ESOPs as a rival method of achieving better results for workers. C.
ROSEN, K. KLEIN & K. YOUNG, EMPLoYEE OwNRsm IN AMERICA: THE EQUrrY SOLUTION
(1986). Strictly speaking, however, the trend toward greater profit sharing and ESOPs was
really part of a new generation's outlook-the outlook of a better educated, more affluent,
and professional workforce seeking an equity role and profit sharing in business. See M.
WErTzMAN, THE SHA
EcoNOMY (1984); Lovett, Profit Sharing and ESOPs: Improved Incentives and Equity, in COR'ORATIONS AND SOCIETY (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds. 1986). ESOPs
and profit-sharing could be viewed as the next logical step beyond pensions for employees.
81. Most of the recent industrial policy literature has stressed the need to face the
challenge of international competition and the need for stronger productivity discipline. See
F.G. ADAMS & L. KLEIN, supra note 76; S. COHEN & J. ZysmN, supra note 76; COMPETITION
IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES, supra note 76; Pma~ns, supra note 76; Tmrow, supra note 76; see
also T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, IN SEARcH OF AMERICA'S BRsT-RUN COMPANIES (1982). ESOP

advocates stress productivity and incentives, arguing that when workers own significant shares
of companies (more than 15-20%), a noticeable bonus of increased productivity is likely to
occur. See C. RosN, K. KIIN & K. YOUNG, supra note 80; see also Lovett, Profit Sharing
and ESOPs, supra note 80, at 302 n.14, 305 n.35. Stronger legal safeguards are needed,
however, to protect employee owned share holdings and pension funds. See Lovett, Profit
Sharing and ESOPs, supra note 80, at n.71; see also Smith, The Cuomo Commission's 'New
Realism', 31 CHALLENGE, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 37.
82. See, e.g., Levin, Smart Machines, Smart Workers, supra note 80 (emphasizing better
rewards and treatment for rising gold collar class). One serious problem is that average real
wages, discounted for inflation, per worker have been stagnant, and average families' incomes
have not gained appreciably. L. MISHEL & J. SIMON, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA (1988).
Further complicating the problem is that a sizeable minority is left with lower wage jobs and
many workers often are trapped in poverty. See Part-timers: Living on Half-Rations, 31
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more complex electronics, equipment, vehicles, word processors, and computerization to achieve higher productivity, a movement toward upgrading
status, roles and even job titles has been evident. Older style adversarial
unionism seems less appropriate. More of the work force is better educated
and often enjoys professional rank as computer, engineering, marketing,
accounting, nursing, technician, administrative assistant, or other "professionals". To some degree, the treatment of employees has become friendlier,
more egalitarian, and less demeaning than it was for old style plant-gate,
time-clock, lunch bucket, blue collar workers. While employee interests still
justify representation, the marketplace and government are developing more
up to date arrangements. Companies and organizations with greater sensitivity and real teamwork benefit from better morale and performance.
J.

Health, Safety and Welfare

Improved health and longevity is an important goal for most societies,
and progress in this direction is broadly popular. This issue involves public
health and sanitation measures, communicable disease control, and the
delivery of basic immunization and care services. The extent of additional
service depends upon the mix of public and private care and private and
social insurance for medical and hospital facilities. Affordability is obviously
a constraint, but rising shares of health and medical care cost are typical
of modern industrial societies. "Good care" is a general aspiration that the
medical care professions and "industry" naturally promote. Choices need
to be made for public health activities, and regulation has been developed
to improve standards, maintain quality, avoid waste, and control costs and
inflation for health care generally. 3

May-June 1988, at 9; Sawhill, What About America's Underclass?, 31 CHALLENGE,
May-June 1988, at 27. Most people want good jobs at good wages, but achieving this goal
CHALLENGE,

requires improving productivity and economic growth. B. BLuEsToNE & B. HARIUsoN, Tan
I)EnDusTRIALLZATION OF AMERICA (1982); F. DucHIn & G. LANGE, TRADIno AWAY JoES: Tin
EsscTs OF THE MERCHANDISE TRADE DEFICIT ON EMPLOYMENT (1988). Compare W. LoVErr,
WORLD TRADE RIVALRY, supra note 4 and R. MCKENZIE, Tan AUmmcAN JOB MACHINE (1988).
83. For most families good health is a high priority. The amounts spent by governments,
employers, and individuals tend to reflect this desire.
Fueled by everything from the use of new, expensive medical technologies to the
increasing health care needs of an aging population, health insurance inflation will
be in the double-digits in 1989 for the second consecutive year. The increase will
bring the total health-care bill of the United States, already highest per capita in the
world, to more than $500 billion.... The projections also raise the question of
whether the campaign to limit health costs-which began in earnest almost a decade
ago-has failed.
Businesses Face Sharp Rise In Worker Health Care Cost, The Washington Post, Oct. 28,
1988, at Al, col. 5. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCPTION: RATIONING
HEALTH CARE (1984); L. BROWN, POLITICS AND HE.ATH CARE ORGANIZATION: HMO's As
FEDERAL POLICY (1983); R. FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS: Tan SEARCH FOR A HEALTH
INSURANCE POLICY (1986); C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE AND POLICY (1988); E. KENNEDY,
IN CRITIcAL CO'DITION: Tan CISIS IN AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE (1972); H. SCHWARTZ, Tan
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Health professions have developed licensing and standards regulation
and are further disciplined, or maybe inhibited, by malpractice and liability
suits. Medical procedures are often risky; the results vary, and there is a
margin for error, negligence, or simply uncertainty. Similar complications
are involved for the drug industry. Food and drug testing and supervision
has become increasingly important for substances that can be hazardous.
Extensive environmental regulation has been added for insecticides, fungicides, rodent control, and toxic substances. The Superfund of 1980 was a
regulated program designed to help clean up chemical wastes. Other important regulation includes the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
and the extensive regulatory authority for the Consumer Product Safety
Commission and Federal Trade Commission. Unreasonable risks should be
eliminated, but achieving this goal is not so simple in practice.14
Uncertainty and incomplete knowledge are characteristic problems in
handling health hazards."5 Liability rules that impose responsibility on those
causing damage make sense, but complex investigation and ligitation is often

A REALISTIC LOOK AT OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1972); S.
ComPEx (1984); Babbitt & Rose, Building a BetterMousetrap:
Health Care Reform and the Arizona Program, 3 YALE J. oN REo. 243 (1986); Macaulay,
Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice: On A Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 91 (1987); Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance: A First Part No Fault
Insurance Proposalfor Resolving the Medical Malpractice Insurance Controversy, 20 J. L.
REroRm 1246 (Summer 1987); Malcolm, Living With the Reagan Era's Cost Consciousness,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at E3, col. 1.
CASE FOR AMERICAN MEDICINE:
Worn, THE MEDICAL INDUSmAL

84. See S. BRowN, EwrmomENrAL H.ALTH LAW (1984); R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENT. KELLER, & L. LAVa, REoULATINO THE AUTOMOBILE (1986); J. DALY & M. GREEN,
HaAT SAm AN ENViRoNmENTAL REGULATION: How EmcCTW7E? (1981); H. GRABowsKu &
J. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFTs AND RISKS
(1983); C. HAm;NTE & B. WOLF, EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL
SA=ry AN HEALTH ACT (1985); L. LAvW, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION
FR mEwoRxs FOR POLICY (1981); W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG
SPECHT,

DEvELoPMENT (1975); Bartel & Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New
Look at OSHA's Impact, 28 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1985); Claybrook & Bolliere, The Hidden
Benefits of Regulation: Disclosing the Auto Safety Payoff, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 87 (1985). An
important distinction should be drawn between situations where well-informed people knowingly
assume risks for potential payoffs (e.g., very sick patients hoping for a cure) and the

uninformed, nonconsenting public, who become exposed to risks through chemicals or other

dangers without foreknowledge.
For discussions of alcohol and drug regulation, see R. ROGERS, THE LAW AND HISTORY
OF INToxICATIa LIQUORS (1985); I. SLOAN, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS ABUSE AND TI LAW (1980);
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO DISTILLED SPIRITS (25th ed. 1985);
Muden, Retail Liquor Licenses and Due Process: The Creation of Property Through Regulation,
32 EMORY L.J. 1199 (1983); Lord, Coming to Grips with Alcoholism, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
RPT., Nov. 30, 1987, at 58. In recent years, drug abuse-especially abuse of cocaine, crack,

heroin, and other "hard" drugs-has brought widespread alarm and has led to increasing
efforts to control or suppress illegal traffic in these substances. Candidates Bush and Dukakis
pledged stronger efforts to deal with the drug problem.
85. See L. LAVE, supra note 84, chs. 2, 3, & 6; Ramo, The Regulation of Technological
Activities: A New Approach, 67 A.B.A.J. 1456 (1981); see also Huber, Safety and the Second
Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985).
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needed. Licensing and registration can force disclosure, within limits, but
future negligence or costly impacts may be hard to predict. Government
monitoring or research might seem desirable, but can be very expensive.
The government more readily administers safeguard regulations and prohibitions without great expense, but helpful experimentation and progress can
be limited thereby. Insurance might be developed, but premium costs are
high when any expensive liability or clean up costs are incurred. Social
insurance or government bailouts may be justified, but large outlays compete
with other government budgetary priorities.
For victims of misfortune, the disabled, mentally ill, and those incabable
of supporting themselves, the question of social insurance or welfare support
is raised. Social Security, old age pensions, unemployment compensation,
workmen's compensation, medicare, disabled assistance, medicaid, family
aid programs, and considerable charitable relief are designed to fill these
needs. Reasonable compassion, suited to the affluence of a nation and its
communities, support these efforts. Payroll and general tax revenues are
needed for this purpose, but it is obviously better to achieve economic
growth and the broadest participation in gainful work to ease these welfare
burdens.
K.

Tax Policies

The basic goals for the tax system are to raise enough revenue for
essential public services, provide for national defense, and meet social
insurance needs. The government should avoid excessive taxation so that
healthy incentives can operate throughout the economy. While tax relief
may be an efficient, low-cost method of subsidizing or encouraging industrial
growth, technical progress, and other social goals, care should be taken to
minimize distortions or windfalls. Even though waiver of taxes may seem
unobtrusive or escape general notice, tax expenditures should be evaluated
as outlays of public resources. Tax expenditures must meet the same tests
for net social benefits as direct spending programs. Unfortunately, special
interests groups often seek tax subsidies to evade more careful scrutiny or
demands for justification. This danger of loophole proliferation is a constant
86
challenge to tax law administration and policy.
Modern tax systems use a medley of revenue sources: Personal income
taxes; estate, inheritance, and gift taxes; corporate income taxes; sales, value
added and excise taxes; payroll taxes; real estate and personal property
taxes; and user taxes or license fees. The most progressive taxes tend to be
personal income, inheritance, and capital gains taxes. Sales taxes may be
regressive depending on the exemptions allowed. Advanced industrial coun-

86. Most tax experts attack loophole proliferation and the inequitable treatment of people
in comparable situations. See, e.g., A. ANDo, M. BLaum, I. FRINmD, THE SmucTUra AND
REFoRm oF m U.S. TAX SYSTEM (1985); J. PEcmHAN, FEDERAL TAx PoLIcY (4th ed. 1983);
S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORm (1973); E. SmmuRE, TAXEs, LoANs, AND INFLATION:
How THE NATION'S WEALTH BEcoMEs MISALLOCATED (1985).
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tries use all these revenue sources, and collect from thirty to forty percent
or more of their GNPs in taxes. Competition among nations for capital
investments and industrial exports tends to enforce some degree of harmonization or restraint on excessive reliance upon any of these taxes. Within
limits, this pressure toward harmonization operates between states or provinces in federal systems, and also among local governments and municipal7
ities.
A moderate overall progressivity of taxes with respect to rising income
seems fair. Extreme progressivity, however, is not easily maintained, other
than in wartime emergencies and can be weakened by substantial international trade and capital flows. The more open OECD economies today no
longer tolerate drastically progressive taxes. Thus a trend in the 1980s
toward more consumption taxes, with somewhat reduced income taxes, has
been noticeable. In many countries, partly because the wealthiest classes
enjoy opportunities for investment abroad (known as capital flight), the
effective marginal tax rate is now greatest for the middle or upper-middle
classes who cannot shelter their incomes as low tax foreign investment or
subsidized domestic investment. This "hump" in the tax curve is a problem
that requires greater attention, and may require international harmonization
measures."8
Reasonable simplicity and integrity for tax collection is an important
goal for any tax system. If a tax system becomes extensively riddled with
loopholes, the revenue base erodes and public confidence in fairness declines.89 General compliance and reporting must be maintained for public
support in democratic nations. United States tax authorities have sought
more simplicity through successive tax reforms, especially with the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. But Congress and other legislatures have moved
generally toward more complex tax laws since World War II, at the same
time enlarging the government and the tax revenue base. Some of this
complexity is unavoidable if incorporation of business ventures is allowed.
87. For recent studies of the structure of U.S. tax burdens for all levels of government,
& I. FmIND, supra note 86; R. ARONSON & J. HuILnY, FINANcING

see A. ANDo, M. BLtrm,

STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS (4th ed. 1986); J. MAXWELL & R. ARONSON, FINANCING STATE
LOCAL GOVERmMNTS (3d ed. 1977); J. PECHmAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES, 1966-85 (1985).

A

88. A. ANDO, M. BLUME & I. FmNm, supra note 86; R. GOODE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE
IN DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES (1984); OECD, PERSONAL INCOME TAX SYSTEMS UNDER CHANGING
EcONOsMC CONDmONS (1986); J. PECHmN, supra note 87; se2 also Makin, A Tax System
Consistent with Fairness Growth and Simplicity, ABI MEMORANDum (Fall, 1985).
89. The problems of distortions and inequities provoked extensive reform effort. See A.
ANDo, M. BLumE & I. FRamEND, supra note 86; J. PECHmAN, supra note 86; E. STEURLE, supra
note 86. For discussions of the Tax Reform of 1986, see AN UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS
OF A HYBR
INCOME-CoNstMrION TAX (Galper, Pechman, eds. 1988); J. BNBAum & A.
MuRRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GuLcH: LAwAEsxa,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRrUMeH
OF TAX REFORM: (1987); D. BRFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); see also D. DAvIS,

UNITED STATES TAXES AND TAX POLICY (1986); D. LE & M. BOSKIN, TAXATION AND THE
DEmcrr ECONOMY: FISCAL PoLIcY AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1986); NEW
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY (C. Walker, M. Bloomfield eds. 1983); J. PECHMAN, THE
PROMISE OF TAX REFORM (1985); J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX PoLcY (5th ed. 1987).
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Enterprise earnings and accounting need reasonable opportunity for plowback of working capital and expansion requirements. If the government
forces owners to recognize major income gains at each step, the owners'
tax burdens increase greatly, and economic growth slows. This problem
leads to more favorable treatment for capital gains than ordinary income.
Once the wealthier classes, who make the most investments, receive this
boon, however, it becomes difficult to contain special treatment. Tax shelter
treatment has spread to pension funds, Keogh plans, IRAs and ESOPs. In
addition, states, local governments and municipalities routinely use tax
concessions to encourage business investments to locate in their areas. When
so many business interests receive relief, the government cannot, without
difficulty, deny concessions to other worthy interests such as the elderly
with reduced retirement incomes, the disabled, those people with extra
health care expenses, and others. Significant tax exemptions long have been
recognized for many charitable, educational, religious, and/or public interest
activities.
In Congress and the state legislatures these complexities are compounded
by logrolling politics. To gain majority support for tax changes, revenue
increases, or cuts, legislators must fashion delicate compromises. Skillful
bargainers in Congress and the state legislatures obtain significant concessions for their allies, and the leaders of tax writing committees enjoy clout
in this respect. Sadly, the more complex a federal or state revenue code
becomes, the more vulnerable it is to insider influence and lobbying. This
politicking suggests the inherent and continuing challenge for oversight and
tribunate work on tax law and its administration. Without doubt, modern
tax law is among the most important, technically demanding, and most
interesting areas for regulatory policy.9'
L.

Competition and Liability Rules

A productive industrial society benefits greatly from healthy competition
within its own marketplace and from reasonable access to world markets.
Therefore, policies to promote fair competition, discourage cartels, restrictive practices and monopolization, and limit unfair or disruptive conduct in
world trade, can improve long term economic performance.9 l In the United

90. Leading experts on tax policy like Stanley Surrey, Joseph Pechman, and Boris Bittker
must be considered important practitioners of the Honorable Profession of Regulation. See
Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax Regulators, 48 Omo
ST. L.J. 773 (1987). Unfortunately, the villains, who need better regulation, are all those with
conflicting interests, legislators, and advocates who play a significant part in each annual
"crystaization" of evolving tax law compromises. It is hard to impose full accountability on
the tax process. The game never ends; it just goes on. See Kilborn, As Nominees Shun Tax
Issue, U.S. Panel Quietly Ponders It, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (describing
National Economic Commission, Co-chaired by Drew Lewis, Republican, and Robert Strauss,
Democrat).
91. For standard texts that stress the importance of procompetition policies, see W.
ADms & J. BROCK, THE BIGNEss ComPLIEx: INDusTRY, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT IN THE
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States a strong antitrust and fair trade law tradition has evolved over the
last three generations. The Sherman Act outlaws price fixing and market
allocation cartels, monopolization, and attempts to monopolize. The Clayton
Act prohibits mergers, price discrimination, tying arrangements and exclusive
dealing when these activities may tend substantially to lessen competition in
any line of commerce in any section of the country. The Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) share enforcement responsibility. Private actions for injunctive relief, treble damages, and attorneys fees greatly strengthen the potential for small business litigations. In
addition, the FTC may challenge unfair or deceptive acts and practices.
Under "Little-FTC" Acts states also may challenge these activities. Many
other nations have emulated U.S. antitrust and consumer regulation since
World War II, and most OECD nations have enacted somewhat comparable
92
laws, including Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC treaty.
Antitrust enforcement in the United States has varied over the years,

with reasonably strong efforts under Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson,
Franklin Roosevelt from 1937-41, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson,
Nixon, Ford and Carter. Significant relaxation occurred in the 1920s and
under Reagan in the 1980s. Some of this rythym is ideological, with free
market conservatives believing that less enforcement is needed.93 Yet mod-

AMERICAN EcoNoMY (1986); T. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLEECxS OF BusnEss (1940); J. BAn,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959); C.D. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF
A GOVERNMmNTAL POUCY (1949); E. Fox & J. HALVERSON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND
TIE MARKET SYSTEM (1979); H. GOLDSCHMID, M. MANN & F. WESTON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: Tim NEW LEARNING (1974); D. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
(2d ed. 1980); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOnIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1959); A.D. NEALE & D.G. GOYDER, THE ANTTRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (3d ed. 1980); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980); W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER: ANTITRUST,
REGULATION AND PUBLIC ENTRPRIuSE (1975); G. STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND
ANTITRUST POLICY (1961); H. THOREILI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF
AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1954); R. WILLS, J. CASWELL & J. CULBERTSON, ISSUES AFTER A

CENTURY OF FEDERAL COMPETION POLICY (1987); Lovett, Antitrust in the Current Economic
Environment, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CORPORATIONS (A. Heggestad ed. 1988); Anticipating
Antitrust's Centennial, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 797 (1987) [hereinafter Antitrust Centennial];Papers
Presented at the Airlie House conference on the Antitrust Alternative, 62 N.Y.U.L. REv. 931
(1987) [hereinafter AntitrustAlternative]; see also B. HAWK, UNI ED STATES, COMMON MARKET,
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST (2d ed. 1987) (summarizing spread of U.S.
procompetition policies to other countries).

antitrust or

92. See supra note 91; see also J. MAITLAND-WALKER, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW
(1984); NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (1982

& Supp. 1985); Lovett, State Deceptive Trade PracticeLegislation, 46 TrL. L. REv. 724 (1972)
(describing "Little" FTC Act developments).
93. The 1980s relaxation of antitrust enforcement was more intellectually developed than
the easing of antitrust enforcement in the 1920s. The most extreme critic of extensive antitrust
enforcement was Robert Bork. See R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF (1978); see also W. BAUMOL, J. PANzAR, & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN,

ANTITRUST

ECONOMICS (1985). Antitrusters, however, mounted a solid counterattack. See W. ADAMS & J.
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erate and liberal Presidents, including most administrations since 1902
consistently have favored moderate antitrust efforts. This attitude reflects
broad constituency support among small business and farmers, most consumers and the general public. Only the largest corporations resist antitrust
enforcement. The majority of people still feel antitrust law and enforcement
are necessary limitations upon the excessive growth, power, and anticom94
petitive practices of the larger business organizations.
Quite apart from controversy over big versus small business in the
economy, recent trends toward increased international trade and increased
imports are also important. In many manufacturing industries foreign
imports have enlarged competition substantially. This improved competitive
rivalry has helped to reduce inflation and may ease the need for antitrust
enforcement in the affected manufacturing sectors.95 For many other sectors,
however, foreign firms cannot seriously alter domestic competition, and the
need for serious antitrust supervision is as strong, if not stronger than ever.
Therefore, antitrust law and regulation are still important for public utilities,
transport, communications, financial institutions, distribution and marketing, franchising, service, health care and insurance industries.9 6 Regulators

supra note 91; Mueller, The New Attack on Antitrust, in PUBLIC POLICY TowARD
CoRPo.AtnoNs (A. Heggestaded 1988); Antitrust Centennial, supra note 91; Antitrust AlterBROCK,

native, supra note 91. In addition, see R. POSNmR, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTWIE
(1976); 0. WILLuaSON, MARKETS AND HIRARCHmES: ANALYSIS AND ANTIRUST IMPLICATIONS

(1975); Bailey & Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, I YALE J. ON
REG. 111 (1984); Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984); Hawk The
American (Antitrust)Revolution-Lessons for the EEC? EUROPEAN Com
rNyL. REv. 52
(1988).
94. Since Thurman Arnold's years as leader of the U.S. Justice Dept. Antitrust Division
(1937 to 1942), substantial antitrust enforcement had been maintained through Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter. For the Eisenhower administration, Bob Bicks and Earl Kintner were strong enforcers. The Nixon administration
had Richard McLaren, Miles Kirkpatrick, and Robert Pitofsky, who were reasonably tough.
Thomas Kauper was reasonably tough in the Ford administration. The only major retreat
came in the Reagan years. Even Reagan's Merger Guidelines (1982 and 1984) concede that
large mergers in relatively concentrated markets can be anticompetitive where serious entry
barriers exist. Also, the Department of Justice continues extensively to prosecute small business
price fixing cartels. See Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 817,
818-829 (1987). For a poignant commentary, see Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the
Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEo. L.J. 1511 (1984).
Yet substantial state antitrust enforcement continues. See Continuation of State Enforcement,
55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 664 (Oct. 20, 1988).
95. The U.S. automobile, consumer appliance, and many other manufacturing industries
have encountered significantly increased competition from foreign companies. The result of
increased foreign competition has been a reduced market shares for major U.S. firms. By the
mid-1980s, seventy percent of U.S. industry suffered from substantial import competition. See
PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL COMiISSION ON INDUSTRIAL CoMP EmTVNESS, I GLOBAL CoMI'ETmoN:
THE NEw REALITY 9 (Jan. 1985).

96. Unlike the situation in U.S. manufacturing sectors, foreign companies have not
displaced domestic firms to any significant degree. In these other sectors concentration remains
unaffected, except for a growing number of buy-outs of U.S. owners by foreign interests. In
these nonmanufacturing sectors, which account for roughly two-thirds of the value added in
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should watch merger movements, takeovers, and concentration trends with
special care in these markets.
1. International Trade Law

A strong network of U.S. remedies against unfair or disruptive conduct
in world trade have evolved more recently. These remedies include countervailing duties for foreign dumping and subsidies or for market disruption
from Communist countries. The government may respond against unjustifiable or unreasonable tariffs, import restrictions, or discriminatory policies
by foreign governments. The government may impose further restrictions

against imports causing serious injury, threatening national security, or
causing balance of payments emergency. Industries suffering distress from

imports also may obtain adjustment relief and assistance. Domestic firms
may bring private actions under U.S. trade law against foreign dumping,

subsidies, or unfair import practices. These firms also can mobilize lobbying
efforts for relief under other statutory provisions. Recent legislation, including the new Trade Act of 1988, has somewhat strengthened U.S. trade
law.97
Trade law in the United States has grown controversial since the 1970s,
especially with large and stubborn U.S. trade deficits in the 1980s. Many

trade experts emphasize two major U.S. mistakes.98 First, excessive U.S.
budget deficits from 1983-88 raised domestic interest rates, valued the dollar,

weakened exports, and encouraged excessive imports. Second, the United
States failed to impose prompt and legitimate trade law relief against

the U.S. economy, the need for antitrust enforcement remains substantial. Even in the
manufacturing sector, despite many foreign entrants, the danger of restrictive practices,
excessive concentration, and weak competition still justifies considerable antitrust enforcement.
See supra note 91.
97. Convenient summaries of U.S. trade law remedies for injurious imports or unfair
trade practices involving foreign commerce are set forth in ExEcUTv OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATWE, PREFACE TO TRADE (1982); U.S. INTERmATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION CrTIZEN's GUIDE TO THE STATUTORY PROCEDURES OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE

CoMMIssIoNs. These remedies, however, as interpreted by enforcement officials in recent years,

have proven weak and ineffectual (except for section 337 proceedings for patent, trademark
and copyright protection against imports). See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL
ECONoMaC RELATIONS, (1987). Congressional dissatisfaction with this weak enforcement, in
part, led to the new Trade Act of 1988. W. LovET, supra note 4, at 105-135; see also
Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Small Aid for Trade?, 58 TrL.
L. REy. 1107 (1984).
98. Most trade experts agree that the first mistake was the buildup of excessive U.S.
budget deficits between 1983 and 1988 which hurt U.S. trade competitiveness. See J. CutLBERTSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1984); J. FAUX, supra note
29. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. can eliminate proverty and achieve full employment
with unequal trade openness. See C. MURRAY, LOSINo GROUND: AmERICAN SOcIAL POLICY,
1960-1980 (1984); W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); Duchin and Lange, supra note 67; LovErr, supra note 4, at 1-135
(collecting extensive literature); C. PRESTOWIZ, supra note 77; H. STr, Tma MYTH OF FREE
TRADE (1985); Ramstad, Free Trade Versus Fair Trade, 21 J. oF ECON. IssUEs 5 (March 1987).
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widespread foreign subsidies, extensive discounting, and dumping in world
markets, and generally lacked an effective response to foreign mercantilism.
Congress has become increasingly firm in its criticism of executive weakness
in trade policy and the failure to enforce more effective reciprocity in world
trade. In reality, successive U.S. presidents, including Kennedy, Carter, and
Reagan, have tried to lead the world toward freer trade with more open
U.S. markets. By the late 1980s, however, it was evident that the government
could no longer maintain the unmatched openness of U.S. markets. The
United States had lost its earlier lead in agricultural and manufacturing
productivity. The U.S. lost its large net creditor lead and became the world's
largest debtor nation due to big budget deficits and heavy foreign borrowing
between 1983-88. Soon the United States must generate a sizeable trade
surplus to service its growing external debt, which exceeded $450 billion in
1988 or ten percent of the U.S. GNP. Although U.S. trade deficits averaged
$150 billion between 1984-88, this level was not sustainable. Meanwhile,
stubborn U.S. trade deficits finally made most observers realize that world
trade imbalances are partly structural; the imbalances reflect the unequal
openness of U.S. markets.
Since the Eisenhower administration, U.S. leaders have proclaimed the
slogan "trade not aid," and have sought to lead the world toward freer
trade and open markets. Foreign markets did not open completely in
response to the opening of U.S. markets, and the U.S. did not seriously
use its own trade law remedies to enforce effective reciprocity. In the later
1980s, however, this "turn the other cheek" attitude began to change. A
shift toward tougher trade bargaining and more effective reciprocity was
gradually under way, with strong Congressional and public support. Negotiations toward an 8th GATT Round in Uruguay, began in the mid 1980s,
and modest progress toward freer trade might develop through multilateral
efforts. But the United States-Canadian "Free Trade" accord, and other
recent U.S. trade bargaining efforts demonstrate that the period of onesided openness is ending. More extensive U.S. use of trade law remedies
seemed likely and closer supervision of trade and capital flows is clearly
warranted. 99

2. Liability Rules
The general theme of tort law is responsiblity for harm caused to others.
Applying this principle under factual uncertainties can be tricky and requires
liability rules, presumptions, and fact finding by lawyers. At least four
major alternative liability rules have been employed: (i) Fault liability for
intentional or negligent misconduct or breach of a duty of care; (ii) liability
without fault or strict liability for those best able to minimize hazard or

99. J. FAux, supra note 29; Garten, The New Protection, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1988,
at A17 col. 2; Greenhouse, The Growing Fear of FortressEurope, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988,
§ 3, at 1 col. 2; Moreno and Ferry, 1992: A United and ProsperousEurope?, FRBSF Weekly
Letter, Aug. 12, 1988; Cheng, Toward Trade Blocs? FRBSF Weekly Letter, Aug. 5, 1988.
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cover the cost of harm or injury; (iii) social insurance or government
compensation (with some risk premia allocated to those responsible or most
apropriate to share expenses); or (iv) victim self-insurnace with no compensation from or liability for others. The problem is to achieve the most fair

and efficient blend of these liability rules for different circumstances. 10 Key
variables include likelihood of harm, controllability of injuries, complexity
of investigation, access to information, ability to prevent harm, capacity to
pay damages or, at least, insurance, costs of litigation, and uncertainties of
fact. Regulation can be very helpful in reducing misconduct, and setting
standards for responsible behavior. The existence of standards for responsible behavior greatly decreases the likelihood of harm and facilitates fair
and efficient liability rule administration.

Broadly speaking, in the types of cases in which injuries are modest
and determinations of cause are questionable or expensive, victim selfinsurance is still the best solution. In the types of cases in which injuries
can be very costly, or more easily preventable by manufacturers or employers

through higher standards of care, strict liability, often supplemented by
regulatory guidelines or standards, is widely employed by modern industrial
societies. In the types of cases in which injuries are moderate, common,
but hard to trace causally, even with expensive litigation, social insurance
compensation or no fault insurance may be the least expensive solution for
society. Workmen's compensation insurance is used widely in the latter
situations, and many states employ no fault insurance for less expensive
auto accident claims.
In other accident, harm, or damage situations, courts tend to apply

traditional tort fault liability rules.' 0' These rules require reasonable proof
by plaintiffs of the harm caused by an act or negligence of others and

breach of a duty of care. Defendants often may mitigate their liability
expense by showing contributory or proportional negligence by the plaintiffs
or by an assumption of the risk of harm by plaintiff's own conduct.
Traditional fault liability is the residual legal liability rule in which the

100. The problem of liability is as old as the law. Providing more peaceable solutions to
human injuries and conflict than blood feuds and warfare was an achievement. But modem
legal systems go much further in efforts to limit or remedy losses traceable to fault, negligence,
or responsibility for modern industrial-high technology activities-with their mixed blessings
of prosperity, harmful accidents and environmental externalities. See, e.g, HENDERSON AND
PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (3rd ed. 1988); PimauPS, PRODUCTS LINumnr (3rd ed. 1988);
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988); PROSSER, WADE &
ScHWARTZ, TORTS (8th ed. 1988); R. RABn
PERSPECTVES ON TORT LAW (2d ed. 1983). In
addition, the modem literature of law and economics is greatly concerned with liability rules
and has enriched substantially tort law analysis. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAw AND
EcoNoMhcs 326-584 (1988); N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, LAw ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1984); LAw AND ECONOMICS (N. Mercuro ed. 1988); M. PoLnSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICs (1983); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); see also, R.
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBIo RISx: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986); Abel,
A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L. REv. 695 (1982).
101. See supra note 100 (listing standard tort law texts).
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special circumstances supporting strict liability, social insurance, no fault
liability, or victim self-insurance do not operate. Traditional fault liability
is more expensive for plaintiffs and requires litigation, but factually stronger
cases presumably lead to easier settlements or bigger judgements.
In the nineteenth century, victim self-insurance and occasional tort (fault
liability) relief were the main solutions to accident and damage situations.
Litigation costs were often unaffordable for poor plaintiffs, and the concepts
of social insurance or strict liability were not yet established. 02 With
increasing affluence and greater social consciousness, a legal trend developed
toward more extensive strict liability, or at least social insurance responsibility, for manufacturers and employers. In the last two generations, strict
liability or social insurance responsibility has been widely established for
manufacturers and employers. 0 3 More recently, however, rising tort liability
costs, bigger verdicts and judgments, and increasingly expensive liability
and malpractice insurance have caused a partial backlash against tort suits
and tort liability.""4
Tort and liability reform movements have been proposed in most states
and generally supported by business lobbies, though resisted by plaintiffs'
lawyers, many legislators, and much of the public. 05 Some reformers want
to roll back tort law all the way back to the nineteenth century and
completely eliminate strict liability or social insurance for accidents or
damages. Such a drastic reversal does not seem likely and commands only
modest support. More likely is a broad effort to limit excessive claims, limit
litigation expense, and reduce the overall costs of liability insurance and its
administration. 'in this retrenchment effort, cutting waste and eliminating
windfalls are important goals. Major targets are excessive insurance company
profits, reserves, or administration expenses, unnecessary litigation and
lawyer fees, nuisance claims and illegimate recoveries, and unduly generous
awards, settlements or windfalls for victim families and their lawyers. '°"

102. See R. RABIN, supranote 100, at 98-138, 161-190; W. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING
SocImY 2d ed. (1972).
103. See R. RABIN, supra note 100; W. FLIEDMAN, supra note 102.
104. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1985); R. LrrAN & C. WINSTON, LIABILITY: PERSPEcTrES AND POLICY (1988); U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON TH CAUSES, EXTENT, AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AvAnA.BnIrr

AND AFFORDABILITY

(February, 1986); Abraham, EnvironmentalLiability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 942 (1988); Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 Omo ST.
L.J. (1987); O'Cormell, A Correct Diagnosis of the Ills
of Liability Insurance-anda False

Cure: A Comment on the Reports of the Federal Tort Policy Working Group, 63 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 16 (1988); Geisel, Few Denied Coverage in the Mid-1980s: Study, BUSINESS
INSURANCE, Sept. 26, 1988, at 3.

105. See also, Hearing on the Cost of the Tort System Before the Subcomm. on Trade,
Productivity and Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 99th Cong.
2d Sess. (July 29, 1986).
106. See Claybrook & Bolliere, supra note 84; Harter & Eads, Policy Instruments,
Institutions, and Objectives: An Analytical Frameworkfor Assessing "Alternatives" to Reg-
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Interestingly, strong regulation efforts can help achieve these goals.
More careful accountability and supervision (maybe at the federal level) is
needed for liability insurance companies, reserves and profits. For dangerous
products, materials and procedures, regulation can provide better guidelines
for reasonable conduct to minimize accidents or harm and limit liability for
people or companies in compliance. Where causation is hard to trace or
litigation is costly, more extensive social insurance or no fault liability, with
tough ceilings on recovery, but providing that medical, hospital, and disability care expenses are covered, would often be cheaper, and more reliable
than present tort litigations. Clearly, the problems of liability will not go
away. In fact, modem engineering, chemicals, machinery, speed and industrial society make extensive injuries and damage inevitable, although their
incidence can be reduced with greater care, better designs, and reasonable
regulation. The real issue is to determine how to mobilize better collaboration between lawmakers, regulators, engineers and scientists, the businessindustrial establishment, and the public at large. We should not despair. In
the last three generations, there has been gradual, but very substantial
cumulative improvement in longevity, living standards and prosperity for
most industrial societies. When so much has been achieved, it does not
seem unreasonable to seek further improvements in the administration of
liability rules, and regulation generally.
III.

CONCLUSION

This review of modern United States regulatory policies illustrates both
the change and the continuity in U.S. regulatory practices. We see less
comprehensive market control regulation (e.g., the retrenchment of agricultural production-price controls of the AAA era, deregulation of CAB control
for airline routes and rates, and somewhat narrower public utility jurisdiction
with AT&T's recent divestiture). This lessening of regulation reflects greater
competition with new technology in some industries like communications
and transport, and a broadened world market. Stronger government surveilance and disclosure disciplines, however, have developed for financial
and securities markets, along with greater regulation and supervision to
cope with health and safety problems, environmental externalities, and
increased congestion in modern urban areas. Macroeconomic coordination

L. REv. 221 (1985); Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334-335 (1985); Nader, Loss
Prevention and the Insurance Function, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 679 (1987). But see G.
BLOOMQUIST, THE REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE AND TRAm'Ic SAFET (1988); Craswell &
Calfee, Deterence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 279 (1986);
ulation, 37 ADm.

Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85

Katz, Measuring the Demand for Regulation: Is the English rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 143 (1987); Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION 53 (1986); Plott, Legal Fees: A
Comparison of the American and English Rules, 3 J. L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION, 184 (1987);
Plott, OccupationalSelf-Regulation: A Case Study of the Oklahoma Dry Cleaners, 8 J.L. &
EcON. 195 (1965).
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is now an accepted responsibility of national governments and central banks.
This responsibility forces substantial effort toward international collaboration among countries, with uneven results. International trade, while becoming freer and more open among many OECD nations, remains significantly
regulated, often restricted, and influenced by exchange controls among the
majority of developing nations.
Regulatory efforts are more selective and carefully limited in certain
respects. Yet, more elements of modern industrial society are probably
supervised and regulated today, taking into account the spread of financial,
safety, health hazard, environmental, and land use regulations. The challenge
for sound public accountability and responsible politics remains important.
Wise regulatory compromises do not create themselves. We need solid
expertise, pragmatic leadership, high quality journalism, objective reporting,
and scholarship. We should cherish and nurture the "Honorable Profession
of Regulation" for successful, long-term economic growth and overall
performance.
Political trends show more watchfulness and concern for the mistakes
of government bureaucracies. We worry about abuses and try to limit them.
We have not, however, developed blind faith in large corporate bureaucracies
as a substitute. People want individual initiative and prosperity to a greater
extent, although the large majority of individuals work in teams for profitmaking enterprises, eleemosyary institutions, or government administration. A majority of people favors a strong and active role for smaller
business, both for efficiency and a more democratic economy. They also
favor freedom of choice and opportunity. We seek to strengthen market
forces and make them work more effectively, fairly, and responsibly.
Unfair, deceptive, and anticompetitive trade practices should be discouraged and eliminated, wherever feasible. This regulatory policy should
continue for domestic commerce and industry, and be applied to international trade. This policy requires antitrust enforcement against cartels,
predatory behavior, exclusionary practices, and mergers that might significantly lessen competition. Antitrust enforcement is essential in recently
deregulated industries, like telecommunications and airlines, in which high
concentration and scale economies often limit competitive rivalry. Securities
law and financial market regulation enforces reasonable disclosure and helps
maintain fiduciary safeguards for banks, thrift institutions, brokerage firms,
insurance companies, pension funds, and ESOPs.
International trade issues present serious complications. Many nations
still employ significant subsidies and restrictions to foster industrial and
technology development because these subsidies and restrictions are in the
best interest of these nations' businesses. Most countries use trade restraints
to some degree, and many employ protective tariffs, quotas, and multiple
exchange rates. While expanding world trade often improves competition
and may lower consumer prices, delicate problems of unequal openness and
cross-subsidy patterns remain unresolved. In some markets, widespread
excess capacity, substantial discounting, and even dumping cause disruptions
and displacement. National safeguard and unfair trade practice remedies
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still need to be utilized, even though gradual progress toward improved
multilateral trade equity might be achieved over the longer run.
Finally, we must realize that basic tort, or delictual, liability, negligence,
and contract, property, and personal rights enforcement are part of the
regulatory environment for modem industrial societies. Administrative regulation merely complements and reinforces, to some degree, a sound basic
legal system. Efficiency, fairness and social responsibility are reasonable
requirements for the basic legal framework, along with sensible regulatory
policy. Yet, liability rules and regulation obviously have economic consequences. Too much regulation, excessive legal restriction, and litigative red
tape can be costly and distortive. On the other hand, a just and humane
society needs healthy law and regulation to improve its morale, social
cooperation, market performance, and remedy externalities. Achieving sensible compromises for these purposes is a continuing challenge for the
Honorable Profession of Regulation.

WASHINGTON AND LEE

LAW REVIEW
Number 1

Winter 1989

Volume 46

Editor-in-Chief
J. PATRICK DARBY

Senior Articles Editor

Managing Editor

RONALD S. RANGE

WADE MATTHEw FmcKE

Research Editor
KEVIN JAMES HENDERSON

Articles Editors
MARY HOGE AcKERLY
THERESA A. CALDARONE
MELISSA J. HALSTEAD-WHITE

EDWARD S. MADARA,

JAMS D.

HIGGASON, JR.

ROBERT W.

KATHRYN

D.

JILL SuzANNE TALBOT

III

DAVID A. McKAY
CHARLES S. MURRAY, JR.

KIRMAYER

PONTZ

ANNE R. YUENGERT
Staff Writers
ROGER ALSUP
R. MICHAEL CLICK
MICHAEL PAUL A. COHEN
KEIrT PAUL DUET

KAREN E. HAVENS
TIMOTHY A. HODGE, JR.
J. GARRETT HORSLEY

F. RUSSELL DuPuy, III
SCOT A. DUVALL
WILLIAM E. FRAzIER

KRISTEN KEY MEAD

ROBERT K. GINTHER

KYmEERLY

JOHN STONE GOLWEN

J. STEVEN PATTERSON

KATHLEEN S. McLERoY
DIANE U.

MONTGOMERY

BETH A. NIGHTINGALE

K.

OLTROGGE

THOMAS W. SmITH, III

DAVID L. GOODE
JOEL A. WAITE

Faculty Advisor
SAMUEL W.

CALHOUN

Staff Assistant
KAREN B. FREDENBURO

DEANS AND FACULTY-SCHOOL OF LAW
JOHN D. WILSON, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., President of the University

P. BEZANSON, B.S./B.A., J.D., Dean and Professor of Law
J. Rrrz, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., ProfessorEmeritus
RoY L. STEINi nmR, JR., A.B., J.D., Robert E.R. Huntley Professorof Law,
Emeritus
EDWARD 0. HENNEMAN, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean and Associate Professor
of Law
MEREDITH SUSAN PALMER, A.B., J.D., Assistant Dean
DENs J. BRION, B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
ROGER D. GROOT, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
MAR H. GRuNEWALD, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
FREDERIC LEE KImGIS, JR., B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
LEwIs HENRY LARuE, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
ANDREW W. MCTHENI, JR., A.B., M.A., LL.B., Professor of Law
JAMEs M. PHEMSTER, B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
J. TIMOTHY PHILmPPS, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
DOUG RENDLEMAN, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Robert E.R. Huntley Professor
of Law and Director of Frances Lewis Law Center
JOSEPH E. ULRIcH, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
SAMUEL W. CALHOUN, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
WILLIAM S. GEnIMR, B.S., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
STEVEN H. HOBBS, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
BRIAN C. MURCHISON, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
SARAH K. WIANT, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Law Librarianand Associate Professor
of Law
GwEN T. HANDELMAN, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
LYM:AN PAUL QUENTIN JOHNSON, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
ANN MAcLEAN MASSIE, B.A., M.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
JUDITH A. McMoRRow, B.A./B.S., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
DAVID K. MLON, B.A., M.A., Ph.D. J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
JOAN M. SHAUGHNESSY, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
GREGoRY HowARD STANTON, B.A., M.A., M.T.S., J.D., Ph.D., Assistant
Professor of Law
THOMAS W. MAPP, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law
EVELYN L. WILSON, A.B., M.S., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
MALCOLM G. CRAwFoRD, B.A., LL.B., Supervisor, Western State Hospital
Legal Assistance Program
LAWMRENCE H. HOOVER, JR., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
J. STEPHEN LAWRENCE, JR., A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
MARY ZANoLLI NATKIN, B.A., J.D., Supervisor, Legal Writing Program
WILLIAM W. SWEENEY, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
PAU.L R. THOMSON, JR., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
EDWARD L. WEILBACHER, B.G.S., J.D., Supervisor, Lexington Legal Aid
Program
LYN F. WHEELER, B.A., M.B.A., D.B.A., Adjunct Professor of Law
ROBERT C. WOOD, III, B.A., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
HENRY L. WOODARD, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
WARREN LEHMAN, A.B., J.D., Frances Lewis Scholar in Residence
RANDALL
WIL-D

